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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Spring of 1992 West Virginia became the first state to
enact the intestacy and elective-share provisions of the Revised Uni-
form Probate Code (1990 UPC). The intestacy provisions increase the
share of the surviving spouse and provide for a fairer distribution
among descendants and collaterals. The elective-share provisions are
influenced by the partnership theory of marriage as well as the support
rationale. Both statutes represent considerable improvements over the
pre-1990 UPC and vast improvements over non-UPC states' statutes
including the West Virginia statutes that were replaced.
This article explains and evaluates the new West Virginia elective-
share provisions. In some minor respects, the West Virginia statutes
deviate from the UPC language. Even where they do not, some un-
answered issues exist that are explored by this article. In some instanc-
es, modifications are suggested that future enacting states should con-
sider. The suggested modifications are primarily limited to simplifi-
cations and clarifications rather than substantive changes. As with any
new statute, there will be unanticipated and inevitable wrinkles that
perhaps only can be resolved through litigation. Despite these minor
rough edges, the enactment of these statutes represents a significant
step forward that hopefully will be followed by other states.
II. GENERAL OvERvIEw OF THE ELECTIVE-SHARE SYSTEM
The drafters of the 1990 UPC adopted an elective-share system
devised by Professors Lawrence Waggoner and John Langbein. 1 This
system is underpinned by both the "contribution" and "support" ratio-
nales. The contribution rationale recognizes that, regardless of the role
played during marriage, the surviving spouse contributed to the acqui-
sition of the property of the deceased spouse. The support rationale
1. For the seminal article, see John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Rede-
signing the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987) [hereinafter
Langbein & Waggoner, Forced Share]; see UNIF. PROB. CODE art. 11, pt. 2, 8 U.L.A. 82
(Supp. 1992) [hereinafter UPC].
19921
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recognizes that the surviving spouse needs continuing support after the
death of his or her spouse.
The new elective-share system approximates the results reached in
a community property jurisdiction while avoiding the complexities of
community property. Although it is influenced by the partnership theo-
ry of community property, it is not community property. As applied to
the facts surrounding a given _couple, very different results might be
reached under this scheme than would be reached in a community
property jurisdiction. Those who accept nothing short of a community
property regime will find fault with this system.
The 1990 UPC continues and strengthens the original UPC's ap-
proach of including will substitutes2 within the reach of the surviving
spouse. This is necessary if there is to be any meaningful protection
for the surviving spouse considering the "nonprobate revolution" that
has occurred during the past three decades.3 This augmentation con-
cept is expanded by including assets even if they were not transferred
by or created by the decedent and even if they were acquired by the
decedent prior to marriage.
The new system differs most significantly from the original UPC
because of two major factors taken into consideration that had been
ignored before: the length of the marriage and the assets of the surviv-
ing spouse. The length of the marriage is taken into account in order
to more accurately implement the contribution rationale. It is not ratio-
nal or fair to give the surviving spouse an entitlement to a certain
fraction upon walking down the aisle. The goal of approximating com-
munity property requires that the assets of the surviving spouse be
considered. In other words, the assets of both spouses are shared-not
just the assets titled in the decedent.
2. Alternative methods of disposing of one's property, i.e., joint tenancy, trusts, and
life insurance.
3. For a discussion of the reasons for the increase of nonprobate transfers, see John
H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
[Vol. 95:55
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mT[. BACKGROUND: FOUR SYSTEMS IN A NUTSHELL
Understanding the 1990 UPC elective-share system requires at
least a nutshell understanding of (1) community property versus com-
mon law, (2) a generic elective-share system, (3) the pre-1990 UPC
elective-share system, and (4) equitable distribution.
A. Community Property versus Common Law
In a community property system, each spouse owns fifty percent
of whatever is earned by either spouse during marriage. This system
recognizes that marriage is an economic partnership, with each spouse
making an equal contribution toward the acquisition of the property
regardless of the role the spouse plays. Separate property consists of
property owned prior to marriage and property acquired by gift or
inheritance during marriage.
When one spouse dies, the surviving spouse is protected by own-
ing what he or she owned all along-namely, half of the property that
had been earned by either of them during marriage. The characteriza-
tion of property as community or separate sometimes requires tracing
the property to its source. In a community property jurisdiction, the
surviving spouse does not have an elective share. The decedent dies
controlling his or her half of the community property.
In contrast, in a common-law or title-based jurisdiction, status
(marriage) does not affect ownership. Property is owned by the person
in whose name it is titled. If one spouse is a wage-earner and the
other a homemaker and childraiser, the earned money is titled in the
name of the wage-earner. If the wage-earner dies first and, for what-
ever reason, devises all to someone other than the surviving spouse,
then the surviving spouse will get nothing unless he or she has resort
to an effective elective-share statute.
B. A Generic Elective-Share System
In order to provide protection for the surviving spouse in those
cases where he or she otherwise would be disinherited, all common-
1992]
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law states except Georgia have elective-share statutes (also called
forced share or right to dissent statutes). These represent one of the
few limits on testamentary freedom in this country. Before elective-
share statutes were enacted, widows were protected by common-law
dower' and widowers by curtesy. 5 Because dower and curtesy were
limited to interests in real property, they were eventually recognized as
insufficient. Elective-share statutes were enacted to extend the protec-
tion by reaching both real and personal property.
The typical elective-share statute, applicable to both spouses,
grants the surviving spouse a certain fraction (usually one third) of the
decedent's probate estate. This often is the amount that the surviving
spouse would take by intestacy. When will substitutes, such as joint
tenancies, life insurance, revocable trusts, and pay-on-death arrange-
ments became popular, disinheritance of the surviving spouse became
an unintended possibility because his or her protection depended on
assets being in the probate estate. In short, the will substitutes were
nonprobate assets, and although the transferors were merely attempting
to avoid probate, it was soon recognized that this could be a disinheri-
tance technique.
Various jurisdictions responded to this underprotection problem by
either statute6 or case law doctrine, such as the "illusory transfer"
4. Common-law dower entitled a widow to a life estate in one-third of the real
property in which the husband was seised at any time during the marriage. See 1 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1-5.42 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
5. Common-law curtesy entitled the widower to a life estate in all freeholds the wife
held during the marriage. Unlike dower, curtesy entitled the widower to a life estate in the
entire freehold. Curtesy attached to equitable as well as legal freeholds, but attached only if
issue of the marriage were born alive. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.57-5.74
(AJ. Casner ed. 1952). Today, all states have abolished curtesy. See JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 398 (3d ed. 1984). Of the states that
have maintained dower, only Michigan does not extend dower rights to widowers. The
Supreme Courts of South Carolina and Arkansas have held that limitations of dower rights
to widows and not widowers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Stokes v. Stokes, 613 S.W.2d 372 (Ark.
1981); Boan v. Watson, 316 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 1984). The UPC abolishes dower and curtesy.
UPC § 2-112 (Supp. 1992).
6. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6111 (repealed 1978) (treating a conveyance by
decedent with retained power of revocation or consumption as testamentary and allowing
surviving spouse an elective share of the conveyance); MONT. CODE ANN. § 474.150 (1990)
[Vol. 95:55
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doctrine7, or the "reality" test. These doctrines and statutes brought
at least some of the will substitutes within the reach of the surviving
spouse. The most comprehensive approach was that adopted by the
pre-1990 UPC. 9
The flip side of the underprotection problem is the over-protection
problem. Again, this results from the fact that most elective-share sys-
tems do not take the nonprobate assets into account.10 Overprotection
occurs when the surviving spouse, rather than a third party, is the
beneficiary of the nonprobate assets. The surviving spouse may be the
beneficiary of life insurance, joint tenancy property, a revocable trust,
and a pay-on-death arrangement and still be able to reach a fraction of
the probate estate.
C. The Pre-1990 UPC Augmented Estate
The pre-1990 UPC attempted to deal with both underprotection
and overprotection with its augmented estate concept. The surviving
spouse was granted an automatic right to one-third of the augmented
estate, which was the decedent's probate estate augmented by
(stating that any gift made by a person "in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving
spouse" may be recovered from the donee and used to satisfy the elective share).
7. The leading case describing the illusory transfer test is Newman v. Dore, 9
N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937). See also Moore v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980);
Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989) (interest retained in
revocable inter vivos trust was so great that transfer was illusory and surviving spouse is
entitled to an elective share of the assets in the trust).
8. Under the "reality" test, an inter vivos transfer is void if it vests no property
interest in the donee. Under this test, any transfer which meets the requirements of a gift
would not be included in the decedent's probate estate. The leading case articulating the
"reality" test is In re Halpern, 100 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 1951).
9. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate
Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977) [hereinafter
Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept].
10. An exception to this is North Carolina's statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)
(1984). This statute involves a two-step process. First it asks if what the spouse gets under
the will plus outside the will (i.e., nonprobate assets) is less than his/her intestate share.
Second, the statute states that if the answer is yes, the spouse gets the intestate share. Thus,
this statute takes nonprobate assets into account in step one but not step two. If there is a
right to dissent, the extent to which the surviving spouse benefitted from nonprobate assets
is no longer taken into consideration.
19921
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nonprobate transfers to third parties11 and nonprobate transfers and
gifts to the surviving spouse. Instead of disclaiming his or her testate
share, anything that the surviving spouse took from the decedent by
testate or intestate succession, by gift, or by way of nonprobate trans-
fers was applied first toward the satisfaction of this entitlement. Only
if there was a deficit would the surviving spouse be entitled to more.
This system, which has been adopted in about ten states, has
several problems.1 One of its complications is the requirement of
determining what assets owned by the surviving spouse were derived
from the decedent, including gifts that were made both during and
before marriage. This tracing is necessary because of the crediting
process that applies these transfers first toward the satisfaction of his
or her elective share. 3 In addition, there are significant loopholes.
For example, life insurance, joint annuities, and pensions payable to
third parties are excluded from the pre-1990 augmented estate. 14 Re-
vocable trusts and joint tenancies with third parties are included only if
they were created during marriage. 5
Even more basically, the pre-1990 elective-share system does not
take the length of the marriage into account. There still can be instanc-
es of overprotection, especially in a short, late-in-life second marriage
where the decedent's desire to provide for his or her children of the
first marriage is thwarted by the elective share.
11. The pre-1990 UPC included in the decedent's augmented estate transfers which the
decedent made during marriage in which he or she retained a life interest, a power of
revocation, or a right of survivorship and maintained that interest at death. Also included
were gratuitous transfers to donees within two years of death to the extent that the aggre-
gate transfer to any donee in any year exceeded $3,000. UPC § 2-202(1) (1983).
12. For a discussion of these problems, see Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra
note 9.
13. UPC § 2-207(a) (1983).
14. The pre-1990 UPC did not include the value of life insurance which the decedent
purchased for the benefit of a person other than the surviving spouse. Id. § 2-202(1). The
drafters felt that life insurance was an estate builder and would not be used to frustrate the
surviving spouse's elective share. See id § 2-202(1) cmt.; G. Michael Bridge, Note, Uni-
form Probate Code Section 2-202: A Proposal to Include Life Insurance Assets Within the
Augmented Estate, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 511 (1989) [hereinafter Bridge, Life Insurance
Assets].
15. UPC § 2-202(1) (1983).
[Vol. 95:55
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Nor does the pre-1990 UPC take into account the assets of the
surviving spouse other than assets derived from the decedent. As ex-
plained below, combining both estates is necessary in order to effectu-
ate the partnership rationale that underpins the concept of marital prop-
erty.
D. Equitable Distribution
During the past two decades the concept of equitable distribution
has swept the common-law states.16 If a marriage ends in divorce,
courts will equitably divide the property, taking all of the circumstanc-
es into consideration, rather than simply letting title control. This sys-
tem is based on community property principles in that it recognizes
marriage as an economic partnership with each spouse contributing to
the acquisition of the property even though what is earned is titled
primarily, or even solely, in one partner.
In community property jurisdictions, the marital property regime
protects a spouse whether the marriage ends in divorce or death. In
common-law jurisdictions, equitable distribution is intended to protect
the less wealthy spouse when the marriage ends in divorce. The 1990
UPC is designed to bring the fourth area into line with the other three
by implementing a partnership theory when the marriage ends by death
in a common-law jurisdiction.17
16. Every state except Mississippi requires equitable distribution upon divorce. See
Dudley v. Light, 586 So. 2d 155, 161 (Miss. 1991). For a state by state discussion of.
equitable distribution, see JOHN D. GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DIsTRIBUTION
(1989).
17. The idea of using equitable distribution at death is not new. Fixed elective-share
statutes traditionally ignore the age of the surviving spouse, the length of the marriage, and
the surviving spouse's actual economic needs. Under the English Inheritance Act, English
courts are given great latitude in determining how much of the decedent's estate the surviv-
ing spouse should receive. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 (1938); Inheritance (Provisions for Family
and Dependents) Act § 1 (1975). The court may direct periodic payments from the
decedent's estate to the surviving spouse, or require a lump sum disbursement. The court
considers a variety of competing equities including the separate property of the surviving
spouse. The Act does not, however, allow the court to reach inter vivos transfers made by
the decedent before death which may have been made to diminish the probate estate.
After a review of the American and English systems, Professor William MacDonald
concluded that the best way to facilitate an equitable distribution of the decedent's estate
19921
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IV. THE 1990 UPC ELECTIVE-SHARE SYSTEM
A. Overview of the Steps
There are four mechanical steps. In some small estates there will
be a fifth step.
1. Augmenting and Combining-Section 2-202(b)
Both the decedent's estate and the assets of the surviving spouse
are augmented by adding in their respective reclaimables (their
nonprobate assets payable to third parties). The two are combined and
added to the nonprobate assets that pass to the surviving spouse.
2. Applying a Fraction-Section 2-201(a)
A fraction, based on the length of their marriage and obtained by
referring to a chart, is applied to the sum from step 1. The figure ob-
tained in this step represents the elective-share amount.
was through a system similar to the English system that could also recapture certain inter
vivos transfers used to diminish the decedent's estate. WILULAM MACDONALD, FRAUD ON
THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960). For a thorough discussion of MacDonald's proposal, see
Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1009-11.
Since the surviving spouse's separate assets would be considered under the equitable
distribution systems but the length of the marriage would not, a surviving spouse with a
large amount of property titled in his or her name may never be able to get any portion of
the decedent's estate. This ignores the fact that the surviving spouse in a long marriage
probably played a role in the decedent's acquisition of his or her separate property. The
UPC recognizes that the surviving spouse's contribution to the decedent's wealth is one
justification for elective-share statutes and justifies the incremental vesting schedule of
§ 2-201. UPC art. IL pt. 2 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
Systems modeled after the English Inheritance Act are subject to the whims of the
particular judge hearing the case. Under such systems, the testator loses complete control
over the distribution of his or her assets. "Disturbing as that prospect is in English and
Commonwealth Jurisdictions, whose judicial selections procedures have produced a trustwor-
thy and meritocratic bench, it is even more frightening to imagine granting such powers to
such American venues as Cook County, Illinois, where the very mention of the local bench
is cause for alarm." Langbein & Waggoner, Forced Share, supra note 1, at 314.
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3. Crediting-Section 2-207(a)
The amount that the surviving spouse takes by testate or intestate
succession or by way of nonprobate transfers is applied first toward
satisfaction of the elective-share amount. The surviving spouse is then
charged or credited with amounts that would have passed to him or
her but were disclaimed. Finally, the spouse is credited with a portion
(up to 100%) of his or her own assets. 8
4. Contribution-Section 2-207(b)
If there is a deficit after subtracting the credits in step 3 from the
elective-share amount in step 2, then the other beneficiaries of the
decedent's probate and nonprobate estate contribute shares to fund the
balance of the surviving spouse's elective share.19 These contributions
are proportional to the beneficiaries' interest in the decedent's reclaim-
able estate.20 If there is no deficit, then the surviving spouse is not
entitled to more unless he or she is entitled to a supplemental elective-
share amount under section 2-201(b), discussed next.21
18. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
19. Donees who receive gifts from the decedent within two years of the decedent's
death to the extent the gifts exceed the gratuitous transfer allowance of § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D)
do not have to contribute unless a deficit remains after full depletion of the decedent's
probate estate and the other components of the decedent's reclaimable estate. UPC
§ 2-207(b) (Supp. 1992). See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
20. UPC § 2-207(b) (Supp. 1992).
21. The surviving spouse is not required to transfer property to his or her deceased
spouse's estate even if the elective-share amount is negative. This would be required if the
goal was to fully emulate community property. Suppose H and W have been married for 20
years. W has sacrificed by staying at home while H pursued a career. H has accumulated
$500,000 worth of property and has sole title. Since H and W have been married more than
15 years, W will be entitled to one-half of H's estate if H dies first. UPC § 2-201(a)
(Supp. 1992). All of H's assets are now "community property." But if W dies first, H will
not be required to contribute to W's estate. Under a true community property system, W
would immediately take title to one-half of H's wages at the time H acquired the property
and would own $250,000 of her own property at H's death. The UPC requirement that a
spouse survive the holder of the marital wealth in order to take what is arguably already
his or her property weakens the contribution theory. "Thus, despite a nod in the direction of
the contribution rationale for the forced share, the designers of the 1990 UPC elective-share
provision are actually resting their device only on the support or need rationale, tempered
11
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And, in some estates:
5. Supplemental Elective-Share Amount-Section 2-201(b)
If, after the deficit is added to the assets that are owned by the
spouse and that pass to the spouse by testate or intestate succession,
the sum is less than $50,000, then the spouse is entitled to whatever
additional amount is necessary to bring this sum up to $50,000. The
purpose of this supplemental elective-share amount is to implement the
support theory. The surviving spouse should not be left with less than
a certain minimum regardless of the length of the marriage.
This four, and sometimes five, step process avoids both the tracing
problems associated with community property and the pre-1990 UPC
and the judicial discretion associated with equitable distribution. Its
most difficult aspect is the augmentation-with-reclaimables process, but
this is required even under the pre-1990 UPC, at least with respect to
the decedent's estate.
A. Discussion of the Steps
1. Augmenting and Combining
There is little disagreement about the general proposition that
nonprobate assets must be taken into consideration. This augmentation
idea is not new, and the reason is obvious. Without augmentation the
decedent could disinherit the surviving spouse by putting everything
into nonprobate form payable to someone other than the surviving
spouse. However, in states that did not enact the pre-1990 UPC's
augmented estate provisions, such as West Virginia, the details in-
by a kind of deservedness based on the length of marriage." Mary M. Wenig, The Marital
Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present, and Future, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 807, 877. But
see Lawrence Mr. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 250-51 n.78 (1991) (conceding that
the redesigned system does not recognize the partnership or marital-sharing interest of the
decedent spouse, but maintaining that giving the decedent's estate an interest in the property
of the surviving spouse would be inconsistent with the notion of elective-share statutes and
would necessitate the expansion of an already cumbersome election system).
[Vol. 95"55
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volved in the list of reclaimables will likely be one of the main con-
cerns of the estate planner. These provisions are discussed below.
The new aspect of step one is taking the assets and reclaimables
of the surviving spouse into account. This is necessary in order to ap-
proximate a community property result. Assume Husband (H) and Wife
(W) have been married for thirty years and that neither has assets in
nonprobate form. Each owns $100,000 that has been saved from his
and her respective earnings during marriage.
If H dies in a community property jurisdiction, H's estate controls
$100,000, representing half of his earnings and half of her earnings.
Similarly, W owns $100,000-her half of the community property. H
is free to devise his $100,000 to a third party, X, since W has no
elective share. Had H died in a common-law jurisdiction devising his
$100,000 to X, W would be entitled to a fraction of his estate under
the elective-share statute. Thus, W would own her $100,000 plus part
(whatever fraction the statute provided) of his, reducing the share that
H intended to devise to X. This would be the result under a generic
elective-share system as well as under the pre-1990 UPC.22
The new scheme remedies the maldistribution that can result under
the traditional elective-share system by combining the two spouses'
22. There are a few common-law states that consider the separate property of the
surviving spouse in determining the elective-share amount. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-29
(1972) (denying the surviving spouse who owns separate property worth as much as the
elective share any right to elect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-18 (West 1983) (charging the
electing spouse with separate property regardless of the source); ALA. CODE § 43-8-70
(1982) (charging separate property of the surviving spouse against the elective share). Ala-
bama has historically feared the "greedy spouse" and even denied a widow's dower rights if
her separate property exceeded the dower interest. Chambless v. Black, 35 So. 2d 348 (Ala.
1948). The pre-1990 UPC includes in the decedent's augmented estate the value of the
surviving spouse's property that he or she received gratuitously from the decedent either
before or after marriage. Also, property given to the surviving spouse by the decedent that
the surviving spouse transferred during the marriage that would have been included in the
surviving spouse's augmented estate had he or she died first is also included in the aug-
mented estate. UPC § 2-202(2) cmt. (1983). Only the spouse's property obtained from the
decedent is considered in the augmenting of the decedent's estate. Since the surviving
spouse only receives one-third of the property in the augmented estate, the entitlement will
be reduced because the full value of the property derived from the decedent is used first to
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assets and then crediting W in step 3 with what she already owns. In
the hypothetical above, the combined augmented estates equals
$200,000. Because they were married longer than fifteen years, her
percentage entitlement is 50%. Thus her elective-share amount is
$100,000. She is then charged in step three with 100% of her own
$100,000, resulting in no deficit. Thus she is entitled to no more, and
X takes the full $100,000 just as H intended.
Taking the assets of the surviving spouse into account means, of
course, that the assets will have to be valued. It is this evaluation
process that will be a concern for estate planners and estate adminis-
trators, because previously they have been concerned only with valuing
.the assets of a decedent-an admittedly easier task. However, this
problem is not insurmountable; estate planners will be able to borrow
from the experience of family lawyers in valuing assets in the context
of equitable distribution.'
Step one requires that the surviving spouse's assets be augmented
with his or her reclaimables. This is simply the counterpart to aug-
menting the decedent's estate. It recognizes the reality of nonprobate
assets: namely, that they are in effect owned by the transferor until his
or her death. If the assets of the surviving spouse are to be considered
in a realistic way, they necessarily must include the will substitutes.24
Step one also includes in the augmented estate the nonprobate
assets payable to the surviving spouse.5 This is the way that the sys-
tem cures the overprotection problem.26 If nonprobate assets payable
to the surviving spouse are not taken into consideration, the elective
share can result in a windfall for the surviving spouse by giving him
or her a portion of the probate estate in addition to the nonprobate
transfers. Hence, these assets are included in the augmented estate in
step one, and then the surviving spouse is credited with their receipt in
23. BARTH GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS (1984).
24. In the case of life insurance, it is not valued as if the surviving spouse were
dead. UPC § 2-202(b)(4) (Supp. 1992).
25. Id. § 2-202(b)(3).
26. This aspect is not new to the 1990 UPC. UPC § 2-202(2)(i) (1983).
[Vol. 95:55
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step 3. This section of the augmented estate is discussed in more detail
below.27
2. Applying a Fraction
The surviving spouse is entitled to a percentage of the combined
estates that increases with the length of the marriage. This incremental
share idea, analogous to the vesting schedule of a pension plan,28 ef-
fectuates the contribution rationale by recognizing that the longer the
marriage, the more the surviving spouse is likely to have contributed
to the acquisition' of the property titled in the decedent's name. It
approximates a community property system where the protection of the
surviving spouse is naturally commensurate with the length of the
marriage because the community assets accumulate as the marriage
endures.
As already noted, however, the community property analogy is not
satisfied to the extreme. In a community property system, the fifty
percent ownership rule applies to the ever increasing community assets,
while each continues to separately own his or her separate property.
Under the 1990 UPC, there is no attempt to separate out their respec-
tive separate property. Instead, an ever increasing fraction is applied to
all of their property. As the length of the marriage increases, the per-
centage of all of their property that is deemed to be marital property
increases. By the time they have been married fifteen years, 100% of
it is deemed to be marital property. The result is roughly equivalent to
the result that would be reached in a community property system,
although, of course, numerous examples can be given where there
would be quite different results.29
27. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
28. Langbein & Waggoner, Forced Share, supra note 1, at 316. See Thomas D. Terry
& Carolyn E. Smith, Guide to the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 24 TAX NOTES 1195
(1984); John Hopwood et al., Selected Current Issues in Community Property Aspects of
Retirement Plans, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 1199 (1987).
29. The different treatment of gratuitously received property can result in a great dis-
parity between what the surviving spouse receives under the two systems. H and W decide
to marry. Before the marriage, W purchases Blackacre and is the fee simple owner through-
out the couple's 10 year marriage. Blackacre is worth $400,000 when H dies. H earned
1992]
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3. Crediting
The crediting process is designed to preserve the decedent's estate
plan as much as possible and to take into account the assets that the
surviving spouse already owns that are deemed to be marital property.
Once the surviving spouse's elective-share amount is computed under
step two, the crediting process takes place in order to ascertain if there
is a deficit-i.e., if he or she is entitled to more.
First, anything that passes to the surviving spouse by testate or
intestate succession is applied toward the satisfaction of the elective
share.31 If W's elective-share amount is $50,000 and the decedent de-
vised $10,000 to her, she will get the $10,000 and her entitlement will
be reduced to $40,000. This approach, which was also the approach of
the pre-1990 UPC, is in contrast to many of the traditional elective-
share statutes which require the surviving spouse to dissent from the
will, thereby disclaiming any devise.
The difference between the two approaches is best illustrated by
the case where the testator devises a life interest to the surviving
spouse. Under the traditional elective-share approach, the surviving
spouse would disclaim the life estate and take an absolute interest in a
fraction of the probate estate. Under the 1990 UPC, the life estate
would be valued and would count toward the satisfaction of his or her
$500,000 during the couple's marriage, and brings no separate assets into the marriage. One
year before H dies, W's mother devises her $100,000. In this case, W will get less under
the 1990 UPC than she would under a community property system. Under a community
property system, W would be entitled to all of her separate property plus one-half of the
wages H earned during their marriage. Thus, W would be entitled to $750,000 when H died
and H could dispose of the other $250,000. However, W would get much less under the
1990 UPC. H's augmented estate would total $1,000,000. Since H and W were married for
10 years, W would have an elective share of 30% of the augmented estate ($300,000). The
30% elective share means that 60% of the combined assets of H and W are now "commu-
nity" property and 60% of W's separate property will be charged against her to satisfy the
elective-share amount. W is charged with having $300,000 (60% of $500,000) of the
$600,000 worth of "community" property. Since the elective share is fully satisfied by
charging W with her separate property, there is no deficiency and W takes no more. Thus,
under the 1990 UPC, W ends up with $500,000 and H's estate retains the other $500,000.
30. UPC § 2-207(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 95:55
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share. This has the effect of preserving the testator's scheme as much
as possible.
Secondly, the surviving spouse is credited with amounts that pass
to him or her by way of nonprobate transfers.31 .Continuing the ap-
proach of the pre-1990 UPC, this provision cures the overprotection
problem that exists under traditional elective-share systems. If the
surviving spouse is the beneficiary of a $10,000 revocable trust created
by the decedent, then $10,000 will count toward satisfaction of the
elective-share amount.
The next provision credits the surviving spouse with amounts that
would have passed to him or her but were disclaimed.32 This in ef-
fect forces the surviving spouse to accept whatever is devised to him
or her because the value of the property will be charged against him
or her whether or not it is accepted. Again, the purpose of this is to
preserve the testator's scheme of distribution as much as possible.
Some commentators have argued that it is unfair to the surviving
spouse to charge him or her with disclaimed property.33 They argue
that if the wife is devised a life interest (as she typically is), she
should be able to disclaim this and not have it charged against her, so
that she can take an absolute interest in satisfaction of her elective
share. Professor Volkmer argues that it is patronizing and chauvinistic
to force her to be a beneficiary of a trust that is controlled by a trust-
ee. If the contribution rationale is to be genuinely effectuated, she has
"earned" an interest in property that includes all of the incidents of
ownership, not just beneficial title.34
31. Id § 2-207(a)(2).
32. I& § 2-207(a)(3). The original UPC, as drafted in 1969, did not charge the sur-
viving spouse with disclaimed property. The drafters amended the code in 1975, and now
such disclaimed property is charged against the surviving spouse's entitlement. UPC § 2-207
cmt. (1983).
33. E.g., Ira M. Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the
Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and Sugges-
tions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 941 (1992) [hereinafter Bloom, Trust and Other Partial Interests];
Ronald R. Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at Death: Re-Evaluation of the Common Law
Premises in Light of The Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV.
95 (1983) [hereinafter Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights].
34. Professor Volkmer favors adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act because
19921
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Another commentator Professor Bloom, focuses on the difficulty
of valuing the life interest. He argues that the only source of valuation
has been the federal tax tables, which seriously overvalue the life
interest.35 This, of course, hurts the surviving spouse because he or
she is charged with this value. Bloom argues that if the surviving
spouse could disclaim without the value being charged against him or
her, the unfairness and the need to valuate would be avoided.
However, if the life interests are overvalued, this hurts the surviv-
ing spouse whether or not it is disclaimed. Therefore, if a disclaimer
is not charged against the surviving spouse, every surviving spouse
will have an incentive to disclaim, because the surviving spouse will
be "overcredited" with the devise if it is not disclaimed. Thus, a fairer
way to deal with the valuation problem would be to devise a more
realistic system of valuation rather than simply reject the disclaimer-is-
charged rule. Again, retaining the disclaimer-is-charged rule helps to
preserve the testator's scheme of distribution as much as possible.36
he believes forced share statutes ignore the partnership theory of marriage. He believes
forced share statutes fail to recognize that the property the electing spouse seeks is rightful-
ly his or hers to begin with. Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights, supra note 33, at 103-04.
35. Professors Langbein and Waggoner respond:
We see the prospect of persistent overvaluation as minimal. Professor Bloom
builds the case for persistent overvaluation on the assumption that income interests
will be automatically valued under the actuarial tables issued by the U.S. Treasury
Department for estate and gift tax purposes. As participants in drafting the 1990
UPC, we wish it to be understood that reference to the Treasury tables was delib-
erately omitted from both the statutory language and the comments. Nothing in the
UPC grants the tables mandatory or presumptive status. In a valuation dispute, we
would expect the party who would benefit from the tables to argue for their use.
We would also expect the party who would be disadvantaged by the ta-
ble-presumably the surviving spouse-to resist their use, by citing many of the
arguments put forward by Professor Bloom. In the end, valuation of income and
other partial interests will be resolved by negotiation and agreement or by the trier
of fact on the basis of the evidence. There is no reason to expect surviving spous-
es to be the persistent victim of inaccurate valuation. Valuation issues are endemic
to any elective-share system and are not restricted to income and other partial
interests. They can arise with regard to partnership interests,closely held corporate
stock, land, and jewelry, just to give a few examples. Nearly all of them will be
resolved at the pretrial or trial stage and not be the subject of appellate argument.
John J. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers.
The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871 (1992) [hereinafter Langbein &
Waggoner, The New UPC].
36. If the surviving spouse is allowed to disclaim property passing to him or her and
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Finally, the surviving spouse is charged with the "applicable per-
centage" of that portion of the augmented estate that represents the
surviving spouse's own assets plus reclaimables. This provision credits
not be charged with the value of the disclaimed property, the spouse can manipulate not
only what he or she takes, but also the share of others. Suppose H and W have been mar-
ried for fifteen years and have no children from their marriage. W has child X from a
previous marriage and H has two children, Y, and Z, from a previous marriage. When H
dies, he has a probate estate worth $350,000. In his will, H devises W $150,000, and Y
and Z $100,000 each. H also bequeaths any residue of his estate to X. H also had a joint
bank account with right of survivorship with X valued at $50,000. The augmented estate is
$400,000, and W is entitled to one-half. If W is not allowed to disclaim, she will have an
elective share of $50,000 which she will collect from X, Y, and Z in proportion to the
value of their gifts. W will end up with $200,000, X will have $40,000, and Y and Z will
have $80,000 each. If W is allowed to disclaim, the $150,000 devised to her would pass to
X under the residuary clause. X would now have $200,000 subject to contribution, and Y
and Z would still have $100,000 each. X will contribute $100,000 and Y and Z $50,000
each. W still has her elective share of $200,000, but Y and Z's portion has been reduced to
$50,000 while X's portion has increased to $100,000. W has been able to increase the share
that her child X receives at the expense of the decedent's children.
TABLE 1-SURVIVING SPOUSE NOT ALLOWED TO DISCLAIM
BENEFICIARY SHARE OF AUGMENTED % OF ELECTIVE CONTRIBUTION NET BENEFIT
ESTATE SHARE REQUIRED ($) ($)
(S) OF BENEFICIARY
W 150,000 N/A N/A 200,000
X 50,000 20 10,000 40,000
y 100,000 40 20,000 80,000
Z 100,000 40 20,000 80,000
TOTALS 400,000 100 50,000 400,000
TABLE 2-SURVIVING SPOUSE ALLOWED TO DISCLAIM
BENEFICIARY SHARE OF AUGMENTED % OF ELECTIVE CONTRIBUTION NET BENEFIT
ESTATE SHARE REQUIRED (S)
($) OF BENEFICIARY
W -0- NIA N/A $200,000
X 200,000 50 100,000 $100,000
y 100,000 25 50,000 $50,000
Z 100,000 25 50,000 $50,000
TOTALS 400,000 100 200,000 $400,000
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the surviving spouse with already owning part or all of what is
deemed to be his or her share of "marital property." The "applicable
percentage" is twice the elective-share percentage that is applied in
step two.
The impetus behind this provision is the community property
paradigm. TPo illustrate, assume the surviving spouse, W, has assets and
reclaimables worth $100,000, that H has assets worth $300,000, and
that they had been married long enough that her percentage entitlement
is 15%. Since 15% represents her portion (half) of the "marital proper-
ty," it follows that 30% of their combined assets is deemed marital
property. In other words, 30% of the $400,000 is marital, and 70% is
"separate."
This 30:70 ratio applies not only to their combined assets, but also
to his and her assets considered separately. Therefore, 30% of her
$100,000, or $30,000, is deemed marital, and she should be credited
with already having $30,000 worth of her elective-share amount. If H
devised nothing to W, and there are no other credits, W's $60,000
elective-share amount (15% of $400,000) is reduced by $30,000. The
remaining $30,000 is obtained by reducing the shares of the other
beneficiaries in the next step, contribution.
4. Contribution
If step three results in a deficit, or if the surviving spouse is enti-
tled to a supplemental share amount, the beneficiaries of the decedent's
probate estate and reclaimables, other than the donees of irrevocable
transfers made within two years of death, contribute proportional
shares in order to satisfy the elective share.37 In the example above,
assume that H devised $10,000 to A and $20,000 to B, and that C was
the beneficiary of a $30,000 revocable trust. Their shares in H's pro-
bate and nonprobate-but-reclaimable estate would be one-sixth, one-
third, and one-half respectively. Thus, to satisfy the $30,000 deficit,
their respective pro rata contributions would be $5,000, $10,000, and
$15,000.
37. UPC § 2-207(b)-(c) (Supp. 1992).
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With the exception of irrevocable transfers made within two yeaws
of death, there is no order of priority as between beneficiaries of pro-
bate and nonprobate assets. Consistent with the rationale of similar
treatment for wills and will substitutes, this recognizes that, in sub-
stance, the decedent is the owner of the nonprobate assets until death.
For that reason, the devisees named in the will cannot expect prefer-
ence over the nonprobate beneficiaries.
However, if there is still a deficit (or a need to satisfy the supple-
mental snare in step 5) after other beneficiaries' shares have been ex-
hausted, contribution will be required from a donee of an irrevocable
transfer within two years of the death of decedent spouse. The purpose
of this layer of priority is to reduce the number of times that it will
be necessary to require contribution from someone who has held the
assets for a period of time.38  With most other probate and
nonprobate-but-reclaimable assets, the personal representative -will be
able to reach them before they have been paid to the beneficiary.
Another possible rationale for this layer of priority is that it recognizes
that there will be times, such as with a premature and unexpected
death, when the irrevocable transfer within two years of death was not
intended as a will substitute.
If the beneficiary no longer has the assets at the point contribution
is required, it may be more difficult, although not necessarily impossi-
ble, to retrieve them. Only original recipients and the donees of the
recipients of the reclaimable estate, to the extent that the donees have
the property or its proceeds, are required to contribute their pro rata
shares.39 A'beneficiary who is required to contribute has the choice to
38. Under the pre-1990 UPC, any remaining balance of the elective share was equi-
tably apportioned among all recipients in proportion to the value of their interests. UPC
§ 2-207(b) (1983). Recipients of gifts within two years of the decedent's death, to the ex-
tent that the gifts exceed $3,000 for one year, were required to contribute in the same
manner as all other recipients of the augmented estate under § 2-202(1)(iv). The 1990 UPC
sets priorities for satisfaction of the elective share. Irrevocable transfers included in the
decedent's augmented estate under § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D) will be used to satisfy the elective
share only after the full amount of other reclaimables have been exhausted. UPC § 2-207
cmt. (Supp. 1992).
39. UPC § 2-207(d) (Supp. 1992). Compare id with UPC § 2-207(c) (1983). During
marriage to W and within two years of H's death, H gives $20,000 to son X. Son X trans-
fers the money to his son Y. $10,000 will be included in If's augmented estate ($20,000 -
19921
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give up the proportional part of the assets or pay its equivalent val-i.40
ueY.
5. Supplemental Elective-Share Amount
As explained above, in some estates, the surviving spouse will be
entitled to a supplemental share amount so that he or she will not be
left with less than $50,000,41  assuming the estate can satisfy
this.42 When the probate exemptions and allowances ($43,000) are
$10,000 exemption under § 2-202(b)(2)Civ)(D)) and X will be liable for contribution even
though he no longer has the money. Y will be liable for contribution only to the extent that
he still has the property or proceeds from the sale of the property. It is unclear whether X
and Y would be jointly and severally liable for the $10,000 if Y still has the proceeds. It is
also unclear whether Y could seek contribution from X if Y pays H's estate the $10,000
contribution.
Another problem with § 2-207(b)-(d) arises when the value of the irrevocable trans-
fer made by the decedent within two years of his or her death decreases and the original
transferee no longer has the property. Suppose H owns stock in a company and two years
before his death he transfers the stock to son X. At the time of the transfer, the stock is
worth $50,000. Under § 2-202(d), the stock will be valued for purposes of the augmented
estate at the time the decedent gives the stock to X. After deducting the $10,000 exclusion
for gratuitous transfers, $40,000 is recaptured in the decedent's augmented estate. Prior to
the decedent's death, the value of the stock decreases and X gives the stock to son Y.
According to § 2-207(d), X is liable for the value of the transfer whether or not he still
has the property. Section 2-207(d) provides that the recipient of the property can either
return the property or pay the value for the amount he or she is liable. Since X no longer
has the property, his only option is to contribute based on the value of the stock at the
time H transferred it to him. See Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1049.
40. See UPC § 2-202(e)(2) (Supp. 1992) (giving protection to payors and third par-
ties); id, § 2-202(f)(1) (protecting bona fide purchasers who purchase property from recipi-
ents of the decedent's reclaimable estate).
41. The drafters commented that "the $50,000 figure is bracketed to indicate that indi-
vidual states may wish to select a higher or lower amount." UPC art. II, pt. 2 cmt. (Supp.
1992).
42. West Virginia has adopted a supplemental share provision that mixes the $50,000
minimum entitlement with a requirement that the amounts described in § 2-201(b) be less
than $25,000 before any supplement is due. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (Supp. 1992). The
result is that only surviving spouses credited with less than $25,000 will receive a supple-
ment while those credited with $25,000 or more will take no more from the decedent's
augmented estate. This method of supplementing the surviving spouse guarantees $50,000 to
some but not all surviving spouses. If West Virginia intended to lower the supplemental
amount to $25,000, such modifications would have been consistent with the intentions of the
drafters of the 1990 UPC. On the other hand, a mixture of more than one value in the
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added to this, the minimum becomes $93,000. The comments state: "In
the case of a late marriage, in which the survivor is perhaps aged in
the mid-seventies, [this] minimum figure... is pretty much on tar-
get-in conjunction with Social Security payments and other govern-
supplemental subsection is cause for concern. Suppose H and W are married and H has
separate property worth $100,000. W has separate property worth $20,000. If H dies after
two years of marriage to W and provides nothing for W by devise or will substitute, the
result will be the same under West Virginia law or the 1990 UPC.
TABLE 3
Applicable Sections of Amouts ()Total Amout Takes





Elective-Shaze Amount Payable From 4.800 $4,800
Decoder's Estate Under
§* 42-3-6(b)-(c)
Supplemental Amount Under 25,200 $25,200
6 42-3-1(b)
Totals 50,000 $30,000
Consider the same facts as above but in this case, suppose H's separate assets are were $110,000.
TABLE 4
Applicable Sections of Amounts (8) Total Amount W Takes Frot





Electlve-Sbare Amount Payable From 5,400 5,400
Deceden's Estate Under
05 42-3-6(b)-(c)
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mental benefits-to provide the survivor with a fairly adequate means
of support."43
Suppose the decedent's probate estate plus reclaimables equals
$90,000, and the assets of the surviving spouse plus reclaimables
equals $10,000. Suppose also that nothing passes to the surviving
spouse by testate or intestate succession nor by way of nonprobate
transfers. The combined augmented estates are $100,000. If the mar-
riage was more than five but less than six years long, the percentage
entitlement would be 15%. Thus, the elective-share amount is $15,000.
The spouse is credited with $3,000 under section 2-207(a)(4) (30% of
her $10,000), leaving him with a deficit of $12,000. When this deficit
is added to the $10,000 that he owns, the sum is $22,000 which is
$28,000 short of $50,000. Thus, he is entitled to a supplemental share
amount of $28,000 in addition to the $12,000 representing the deficit.
In short, he is entitled to a total of $40,000 from the decedent's pro-
bate estate plus reclaimables.
What is the purpose of making these calculations when it appears
as though the $40,000 could be derived from simply subtracting the
minimum ($50,000) from the spouse's assets ($10,000)? The calcula-
tions are necessary because the elective-share amount might bring the
survivor's assets over the minimum so that the supplemental share
amount is not necessary. If the elective-share amount is not calculated
(if the spouse is simply brought up to the minimum), then he or she
might be deprived of a larger amount to which he or she is entitled.
For example, suppose the surviving spouse () has assets of
$40,000 and the decedent (H) has a probate estate plus reclaimables
consisting of $160,000. The combined augmented estates are $200,000.
If the percentage entitlement is 15%, the elective-share amount is
$30,000. W is credited with 30% of $40,000, or $12,000, leaving her
with a deficit of $18,000. Thus, she is entitled to $18,000 from H's
probate estate and nonprobate estate. If she had simply been given
$10,000 to bring her up to the $50,000 minimum, she would have
been deprived of her additional $8,000 entitlement under her elective
share.
43. UPC art. II, pt. 2 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
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V. THE AUGMENTED ESTATE: A CLOSER LOOK
Section 2-202(b) lists the assets that are-in the augmented estate.
It is organized as follows:
1. Decedent's net probate estate44






(iv) Transfers by the decedent during marriage4 9
(A) Transfers with retained life estate5°
(B) Powers51
(C) Joint tenancies created within two years of death
52
(D) Transfers within two years of death53
3. Nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse54
4. Assets of the surviving spouse plus reclaimables55
44. UPC § 2-202(b)(1) (Supp. 1992). Decedent's net probate estate is decedent's gross
probate estate reduced by funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance, family
allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims. The term "claims" is defined by the
UPC as including:
liabilities of the decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort,
or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after death of the dece-
dent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and
expenses of administration. The term does not include estate or inheritance taxes,
or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific
assets alleged to be included in the estate.
Id. § 1-201(6). See also id. § 2-202 cmt.
45. 1& § 2-202(b)(2).
46. 1&. § 2-202(b)(2)(i).
47. IM. § 2-202(b)(2)(ii).
48. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(iii).
49. I1& § 2-202(b)(2)(iv).
50. I& § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A).
51. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B).
52. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C).
53. IA § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D).
54. Id § 2-202(b)(3).
55. Id. § 2-202(b)(4). The reclaimables are those assets that would be included in the
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Section 2-202(b)(2) lists the reclaimables-i.e., the nonprobate
assets payable to third parties 6-that are reachable by the surviving
spouse to satisfy the elective share. The first three sub-sections, (i)-
(iii), deal with assets whether created before or during marriage and
whether created by the decedent or another transferor. The general
theory of the first two sections is that the decedent should be consid-
ered the owner of the property if, during lifetime, he or she could
have made himself or herself the full technical owner.57 The third
section, dealing with life insurance, is broader. The last sub-section,
(iv), lists four sub-categories of assets transferred by the decedent
during marriage. These are transfers that traditionally have raised con-
cerns about opportunities for intentional disinheritance."
A. Powers-Section 2-202(b)(2)(i)
This section includes assets over which the decedent alone held a
presently exercisable general power of appointment59 immediately be-
fore his or her death. Such assets would also be included if the dece-
dent, while married to the surviving spouse and within two years of
death, released the power or exercised it in favor of someone other
than the decedent or the decedent's estate, spouse, or surviving spouse.
The latter inclusion prevents the decedent from, for example, shielding
the assets by simply releasing the power in anticipation of death.'
surviving spouse's augmented estate under § 2-202(b)(2) had the surviving spouse been the
first to die.
56. For purposes of this article "third party" means someone other than the surviving
spouse.
57. UPC § 2-202 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
58. The pre-1990 UPC limited reclaimables to transfers made by the decedent during
marriage. UPC § 2-202(1) (1983). See also id § 2-202 cmt. (indicating that a principle
reason for the limitation was to allow divorced or widowed spouses the opportunity to
provide for the children of the previous marriage without worrying that the proceeds will be
subject to the future spouse's elective share).
59. "Presently exercisable general power of appointment" is defined as "a power of
appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent by an exercise of the power
could have created an interest, present or future, in himself [or herself] or his [or her]
creditors." UPC § 2-202(a)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1992).
60. Or, to use another illustration, it prevents the decedent from avoiding the forced
share by retaining a power that ends two months before death.
[V/ol. 95:55
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An important loophole that exists under the pre-1990 UPC is
closed by this section. Since a power to revoke is simply one kind of
power of appointment, this section includes a trust over which the
decedent retained a power to revoke, even if the trust was created
prior to marriage.61 Thus, if prior to his marriage to W, H transfers
$100,000 into a revocable trust, naming his children from his first
marriage to take at his death, the corpus will be included in the aug-
mented estate under this section. Under the pre-1990 UPC, this trust
would not be included since it was created prior to marriage. The
rationale for the change is that since the decedent could have revoked
the trust and given it to himself during marriage, he should be treated
as the owner even if the trust was created prior to marriage.
This section includes interests created by the decedent and by
others. If H's mother M had devised Blackacre "to H for life, then to
whomever H shall appoint," H would have a life estate and a general
power to appoint the remainder. At H's death, survived by W,
Blackacre would be included in the augmented estate under this sec-
tion because, immediately before his death, H had a presently exercis-
able general power of appointment over Blackacre. During H's mar-
riage to W, H could have appointed the remainder in Blackacre to
himself. It does not matter if M died before or after H's marriage to
W.
For a power 2 to be included within this section, it must be "held
by the decedent alone." Therefore, if the transferor requires that the
power be exercised with the consent of someone else (even a
nonadverse party), the property will not be included. For example, if
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (1986); see Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Marital Property Rights in Transition, 18 PROB. L. 1, 46 n.92 (1992); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 748 n.169 (1992). One commentator mistakenly
assumed that a revocable trust would not be included under the 1990 UPC if it was created
prior to marriage. Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage and the Uniform Probate
Code's Redesigned Elective Share-Why the Partnership is Not Yet Complete, 25 IND. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1991) [hereinafter Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage]. Confusion would
have been avoided if § 2-202(b)(2)(i) had expressly included a power to revoke.
62. For the sake of brevity, the statement that a "power" is included in the augment-
ed estate means the "property over which the decedent had a power of appointment" is
included in the augmented estate.
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M devised Blackacre "to H for life, then to whomever H, with the
consent of J, shall appoint," Blackacre would not be included within
this section. However, if the decedent (rather than some other trans-
feror) creates the power during marriage, the property is included
under section 2-202 (b) (2) (iv) (B) as discussed later. In short, if a do-
nor wants to provide for his or her children from an earlier marriage
by way of a revocable trust, the trust must be created prior to mar-
riage, and the power to revoke must require the consent of another
person.
Although treated as owned by the decedent for federal estate tax
purposes, the UPC declines to include a purely testamentary power
within the reach of the elective share. Thus, if M had devised
Blackacre "to H for life, then to whomever H shall appoint by will,"
Blackacre would not be included in the augmented estate. H's power is
testamentary rather than presently exercisable-i.e., H has the power to
devise Blackacre to his estate or to the creditors of his estate, but H
cannot exercise it during his. lifetime.
Does limiting this section to presently exercisable general powers
of appointment create an objectionable loophole? It can be argued that
if a presently exercisable power is one signature away from outright
ownership, then a testamentary power is not far enough behind to
justify different treatment. However, a justification for exclusion of a
testamentary power is apparent when considering the practical effect of
including it. If included, a decedent would be deterred from devising a
testamentary power of appointment to his or her surviving spouse
because that would bring the asset within the reach of the surviving
spouse's potential subsequent surviving spouse.
For example, if H devised Blackacre "to W for life, then to
whomever W shall appoint by will," the. inclusion of testamentary
powers within the augmented estate would mean that if W remarried
and then died survived by H#2, Blackacre would be reachable by H#2.
To avoid this, H would use a qualified terminal interest property trust
(QTIP trust)63 rather than a life estate coupled with a testamentary
63. A QTIP trust is a marital deduction bequest in which the surviving spouse re-
ceives all the income for life payable at least annually, but is not given a general power of
[Vol. 95:55
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power of appointment. This, the argument goes, would be to W's detri-
ment because it decreases her interest in Blackacre. Thus, the better
view is to exclude purely testamentary powers to avoid deterring their
use.
B. Joint Tenancies-Section 2-202(b)(2)(ii)
This section includes property in the augmented estate held by the
decedent and a third party as joint tenants with the right of survivor-
ship "to the extent of the decedent's unilaterally severable interest
therein." 64 Thus, if H and his friend F own Whiteacre (worth
$100,000) as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and H dies
survived by W, $50,000 worth of Whiteacre will be included in H's
augmented estate under this section. It does not matter whether
Whiteacre was purchased before or after H and W were married, and it
does not matter how much, if any, of the purchase price was provided
by H. As with the section above, this section also includes such prop-
erty if the decedent transferred it to a third party within two years of
death and while married to the surviving spouse.
The West Virginia provision deviates significantly from the UPC
provision by limiting this section to joint tenancy property acquired
during the marriage to the surviving spouse.65 Therefore if, prior to
H's marriage to W, H (or F) purchased Blackacre for $500,000,
putting title in the name of "H and F as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship," and H dies survived by F and W, no portion of the
value of Blackacre will be included in H's augmented estate in West
Virginia because Blackacre was not acquired during H's marriage to
W. Presumably, the West Virginia limitation reflects one or both of
two views. First, the creation of joint tenancy property prior to mar-
riage is not likely to be used as a tool for disinheritance of a prospec-
appointment. Since the trust qualifies for the unlimited marital deduction, it is a popular
way to control the ultimate disposition of the decedent's property while, providing for the
surviving spouse for life. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 qualified the QTIP trust
for the marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992); ERNEST FIORE,
JR. Er AL., MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 1.08(2), at 1-54 (1992).
64. UPC § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1992).
65. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-2(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1992).
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tive spouse. Secondly, it is unfair to bring this property within the
reach of the surviving spouse, because it is not "marital property"
since it was acquired prior to marriage. However, the latter point is
equally applicable to powers created prior to marriage. Thus, it is
questionable whether joint tenancy property should be treated different-
ly from powers and West Virginia's statute is arguably inconsistent in
doing so.
The rationale of the UPC, which would include half the value of
Blackacre, is that during H's marriage to W, H had the power to sever
his one-half interest in Blackaere and transfer it to anyone, including
himself. Therefore, he should be treated as the owner for purposes of
the elective share even if Blackacre was acquired before marriage.
Thus, the UPC's rationale for including a portion of the joint tenancy
property within this section, even if acquired before marriage, is con-
sistent with the rationale for including powers of appointment created
prior to marriage.
Even the broader UPC arguably creates at least some potential for
using joint tenancy property for intentional disinheritance. If acquired
before marriage, only H's unilaterally severable interest is included in
the augmented estate, even if H contributed all of the purchase price.
Thus, if, prior to his marriage to W, H pays $500,000 for Greenacre
and puts it in the name of "H and F as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship," only half of it will be included under this section. This,
in effect, allows H to keep $250,000 from the reach of the elective
share. The rationale for the UPC position is that H could have given
$250,000 to F outright. In effect, the creation of the joint tenancy is
giving F an outright gift of property worth $250,000. It is so treated
for federal gift tax purposes. Furthermore, this is unlikely to become a
common technique for decedents intent on disinheriting their prospec-
tive spouses since it shelters only half of the joint tenancy property.
Nonetheless, the UPC's decision to bring the other half in, even if
acquired prior to marriage, seems justified.
With regard to real property, the "unilaterally severable interest" is
the decedent's pro rata share based on common-law joint tenancy prin-
ciples. If A and B own Blackacre as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship, A and B each own an undivided one-half interest, and
[Vol. 95:55
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during their joint lives either one can unilaterally sever the joint tenan-
cy by conveying his or her interest to a third party. Thus if A conveys
his interest to C, the joint tenancy is severed, and B and C own
Blackacre as tenants in common.
With regard to personal property, the portion that is "unilaterally
severable" often is a matter of state statutory law. The elective-share
provisions of the UPC were drafted with other provisions of the UPC
in mind. For example, in the case of a joint bank account, the UPC
provides that during the lifetimes of the joint tenants, each owns the
portion that he or she contributed unless there is clear and convincing
evidence of a different intent.6 Thus, if A and B have a joint bank
account in a jurisdiction that has adopted section 6-211 of the UPC
along with the elective-share provisions, and if A contributed $50,000
and B contributed $20,000, then $50,000 would be included in A's
augmented estate under this section if A predeceases B.
There is considerable variation among the jurisdictions on the law
of joint tenancy ownership of personal property, with much of it gov-
erned by statute. Stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, and bank ac-
counts are often owned in joint tenancy form. Although derived from
the law of real property, the law of joint tenancy ownership of per-
sonal property has had to adapt to quite different expectations of the
co-tenants with regard to their respective rights and duties in, for ex-
ample, a fluctuating fund. In a jurisdiction that has not adopted section
6-211, it may be that during the lifetimes of the joint tenants of a
bank account, local law provides that each owns his pro rata share
rather than the amount contributed.68 In short, the law of the jurisdic-
66. UPC § 6-211 (Supp. 1992). See also id § 6-211 cmt. (stating that the section
only applies to the relationship of parties to the account and not to the relationship between
the parties and the financial institution).
67. That is, the signature card names the owners as "A and B as joint tenants vith
the right of survivorship."
68. It is well established by case law that the statement on the signature card does
not necessarily reflect the understanding or the rights of the owners of the joint bank ac-
count vis-a-vis each other, rather, it is there to protect the bank. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Short,
205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974). For example, if the signature card to a $100,000 joint bank
account provides that either A or B may withdraw any portion of it, this provision merely
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tion will determine, in the case of joint tenancy ownership of personal
property, what portion is the decedent's "unilaterally severable inter-
est.19
If the joint tenancy property is acquired during marriage and with-
in two years of H's death, its value is included in the augmented
estate, to the extent that H contributed to its purchase price, under
section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C) (enacted in West Virginia without modifica-
tion) as discussed below."
protects the bank in the event that A sues the bank for paying all of it out to B. It does
not protect B from being sued by A to recover the portion that A owned on the basis of
their understanding or on the basis of local law. See UPC § 6-221 (Supp. 1992); id § 6-
221 cmt.; id § 6-226; id § 6-226 cmt.
69. The decedent's unilaterally severable interest in jointly held personal property with
a right of survivorship is a matter of state law. The critical factor used by most states,
including West Virginia, is the intent of the depositor. In West Virginia, during the life of
a depositor who deposits funds into a joint survivorship bank account naming another per-
son as joint tenant, a rebuttable presumption exists that ownership of funds is joint. The
presumption allows each co-tenant the right to unilaterally sever his or her pro rata share of
the assets. Competent evidence may rebut the presumption thus entitling the depositor to
sole ownership during his or her lifetime. See W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33 (1990); Simons v.
Simons, 298 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that rebuttable presumption arises that
ownership in joint survivorship bank account is joint regardless of the source of funds, and
the depositor's unilateral withdrawal of the funds does not rebut the presumption that a gift
was intended); Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend, 253 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1979) (establishing
that if parties to a joint account with survivorship occupy 'a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship, a presumption of constructive fraud may arise which shifts the burden to party
who benefitted from the creation of the account to show that it was in fact a bona fide
gift); Dorsey v. Short, 205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974) (holding that issue as to whether
conditions placed on a joint bank entitled depositor to ownership of funds account presented
a fact question); John W. Fisher, II, Joint Tenancy in West Virginia: A Progressive Court
Looks at Traditional Property Rights, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 267 (1988-89).
70. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. It is possible for property to fall
within more than one provision. For example, during marriage and within two years of
death, H and friend F purchase Blackacre for $100,000 with H contributing $40,000 and X
contributing $60,000. This type of transfer technically falls within the provisions of
§ 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C). It also falls within § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) to the extent of H's unilaterally
severable interest in Blackacre. This apparent ambiguity is solved by § 2-202(d) which
states that if the reclaimable would fit into more than one part of § 2-202(b)(2), the proper-
ty will be included under the part that yields the highest value. UPC § 2-202(d) (Supp.
1992). Therefore, under these facts, $50,000 would be included in the augmented estate
despite the fact that the decedent only contributed $40,000 of the purchase price.
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C. Life Insurance-Section 2-202(b)(2)(iii)
This section closes a loophole that existed in the pre-1990 UPC
by including in the augmented estate the proceeds of insurance on the
life of the decedent payable to a third party if the decedent had certain
incidents of ownership,71 whether acquired before or during marriage.
As with the previous two sections, the proceeds are also included if
the decedent transferred the policy to a third party while married and
within two years of death. The pre-1990 UPC excluded life insurance
payable to a third party from the augmented estate, because, as the
comments explained, "it is not ordinarily purchased as a way of de-
pleting the probate estate and avoiding the elective share of the
spouse.9
72
The drafters of the 1990 UPC thought otherwise73, and included
insurance in a section that is broader in some respects than the two
above. The general theory of subsections (i) and (ii) above (powers
and joint tenancies) is that the decedent should be treated as the owner
for purposes of the elective share if he could make himself the "full
technical owner" during his lifetime.74 Here, the proceeds of life in-
surance will be included in the augmented estate even if the decedent's
only interest is the right to change the beneficiary. Although seeming
to go beyond the rationale for inclusion, this is consistent with treat-
ment of life insurance for federal estate tax purposes.75
71. That is, if the decedent "owned the insurance policy, had the power to change the
beneficiary of the insurance policy, or the insurance policy was subject to a presently exer-
cisable general power of appointment held by the decedent alone immediately before his [or
her] death." UPC § 2-202(b)(2)(iii) (Supp. 1992). See also I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1988).
72. UPC § 2-202 cmt. (1983).
73. The comments to the 1990 UPC state, "Mhis move [to include it] recognizes that
such arrangements could, under the pre-1990, have been used to deplete the estate and
reduce the spouse's elective-share entitlement." UPC § 2-202 cmt. (Supp. 1992). See also
Bridge, Life Insurance Assets, supra note 14 (advocating the inclusion of life insurance pro-
ceeds payable to third parties in the decedent's augmented estate); Sidney Kwestel & Rena
C. Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes: Retained Interests, Custodial Accounts and Contrac-
tu'l Transactions-A New Approach, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 63-65 (1988) (pointing out the
loophole created by the exclusion of life insurance and advocating inclusion of the proceeds
in the augmented estate).
74. UPC § 2-202 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
75. I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1988). Inclusion of life insurance proceeds on the life of the
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Suppose that the only interest the insured has is the right to
change the beneficiary to someone other than himself or his estate.
Assume also that the named beneficiary is A. Is there a concern that
the insured (R) and A might have an agreement that H will not change
the beneficiary in exchange for A's promise to transfer half of the
proceeds to the creditors of his estate? Or, perhaps H could promise A
not to change the beneficiary in exchange for $100,000. In this way, H
benefits during his lifetime. However, there could be the same kind of
arrangement if H had a non-general power of appointment over trust
assets. If it is non-general, it would not be pulled in under subsection
(i), and yet there could be a similar arrangement to benefit the donee.
In other words, collusion is always a possibility. This may be the
rationale behind the transfer tax laws,76 but it is not clear that there
needs to be such a broad sweep with the elective-share provisions.
D. Transfers by the Decedent During Marriage-
Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)
This section is divided into four sub-sections, all of which address
transfers by the decedent during the marriage to the surviving spouse.
In the pre-1990 UPC, only these kinds of transfers payable to third
parties were included in the augmented estate.77 The provisions in the
four sub-sections are similar to the pre-1990 UPC provisions. Because
these are transfers by the' decedent during marriage, there is more
concern for their use as devices of disinheritance. Hence, they are
decedent payable to a third party is a major modification of the pre-1990 UPC. "The fine-
spun tests of the Federal Estate Tax Law might be utilized, of course. However, the objec-
tives of a tax law are different from those involved here in the Probate Code, and the
present section is therefore more limited. It is intended to reach the kinds of transfers readi-
ly usable to defeat an elective share in only the probate estate." UPC § 2-202 cmt. (1983).
The realization that a decedent may deplete his or her estate by purchasing life insurance is
a positive step toward closing loopholes found in- earlier versions of the Code. On the other
hand, by including the insurance proceeds in the augmented estate, even if the decedent
acquired one of the listed interests before marriage, the drafters seem to go beyond their
stated goal of preventing the depletion of the estate.
76. I.R.C. § 2038 (1988).
77. UPC § 2-202(1) (1983).
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somewhat broader than the above three sections that are not limited to
transfers by the decedent during marriage.
The policy behind these sections is similar to the policy behind
the federal transfer tax provisions which include similar assets in the
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Although the tax provisions
are somewhat broader, the rationale for both is that the decedent has
enjoyed the economic benefit of the property until the time of his
death just as he has with the assets that are in his probate estate;
therefore, he should be treated as the owner. Although the rationale for
inclusion is the same, the ultimate goal is not. The goal of the transfer
tax is to spread the wealth among society, while the goal of the elec-
tive share is to achieve a fair balance between the surviving spouse
and the other beneficiaries of the decedent's estate. Nonetheless, be-
cause the underlying rationale is the same, courts will likely look to
tax cases for authority when similar issues arise in the context of the
elective-share statute.7"
1. Transfer With Retained Life Estate-Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A)
This section includes transfers by the decedent where the decedent
retained, at the time of or within two years of death, the possession or
enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property. Thus, if during
his marriage to W, H transfers Blackacre "to X at my death" or "to
myself for life, then to X," Blackacre will be included in H's augment-
ed estate under this section. This is a transfer-with-retained-life-estate,
a standard will substitute that was included in the augmented estate
under the pre-1990 UPC and that is included in the gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes.79
Of course, the asset transferred might be personal property rather
than real property. For example, assume that during marriage H trans-
ferred $100,000 to T in trust to invest the money for the benefit of H
78. Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1024-26.
79. I.R.C. § 2036 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See also Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept,
supra note 9, at 1024-26 (discussing several applications of UPC § 2-202(1)(i) (1983) such
as transfers in trust to satisfy support obligation and transfers of Blackacre with understand-
ing that transferor will live on Blackacre for the rest of his life).
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for life, then to Q. At H's death survived by W, the corpus of the
trust would be included in the augmented estate under this section.
This section is not expressly limited to a retained life estate. If it
were, it would be easy to avoid by simply conveying Blackacre "to A
at the end of fifty years." H, in effect, has reserved a term of years
for fifty years. If H's life expectancy is less than fifty years, then H
can expect to enjoy possession of Blackacie until his death just as if
he retained a life estate. This would easily shelter Blackacre from the
augmented estate if the statute were limited to transfers with a retained
life estate. Since the provision is not so limited, transferors will be
deterred from retaining a term of years, because there is no reason to
take a chance on retaining a term of years that expires before they do.
Thus, it will almost always be the transfer with retained life estate that
gets nabbed under this section.
One commentator has argued that a retained life estate should
trigger inclusion even if created prior to marriage. 0 She points out
that a prospective spouse may not realize that Blackacre, which her
fiance occupies, is not owned in fee simple absolute. She argues that
"[b]y bringing the life estate into the marriage ... when a couple may
enjoy its benefits, a spouse should be deemed to have converted it into
partnership property. '' 81 A counter response is that if a transfer with
retained life estate is made prior to marriage, it is only a life estate
that is brought into the marriage. This is an interest that will be en-
joyed by them during their joint lives and that will end at the death of
the life tenant.
More persuasive is her point that during their marriage, the life-
tenant spouse may be making mortgage payments with funds that
should be considered marital.82 Carrying her point one step further,
economically, at least, the interests of the remaindermen are being
created during marriage with each mortgage payment constituting a
mini-transfer with retained life estate. A compromise position might be
to include the pro rata share of the property based on the percentage
80. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage, supra note 61.
81. Id at 58.
82. Id at 65.
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of mortgage payments made during marriage; however, this complica-
tion may not be worth the effort. Unlike with a power to appoint to
himself created prior to (but exercisable during) marriage, the transfer-
or who retains a life estate has made an irrevocable commitment to
the remaindermen prior to marriage, and the mortgage payments can
be viewed as relating back to the time the life estate was created.
I Finally, with regard to her point about the use of "marital assets,"
there are other instances where a spouse can transfer property that
would be considered community property in a community property
jurisdiction and thereby keep it out of the augmented estate. For ex-
ample, during marriage the propertied spouse can simply give away
money that he or she earned while married. As long as the transfer is
not within two years of death, it will be excluded from the augmented
estate. Presumably, the spouse would be deterred from such generosity,
and especially would not use such means simply to defeat the forced
share.
In short, with regard to transfers with a retained life estate, it is
reasonable to limit the reach of the elective-share provisions to those
that are made during the marriage to the surviving spouse. It allows a
spouse to protect the children from a prior marriage by naming them
the remaindermen in a pre-marital transfer. It would not, however,
preclude the surviving spouse from recovering on the basis of misrep-
resentation of assets by the decedent in those cases where the evidence
supports such a finding.
Other issues exist with regard to retained life interests, some of
which are not new to the 1990 UPC. Professor Kurtz, in his pre-1990
UPC article, raises the issue of whether the retained life estate section
would include a trust created by the decedent during marriage where
the payment of income is purely discretionary. He notes that, if the tax
litigation analogy holds, the interest would not be included.83 A
83. Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1025. See LR.C. § 2036(a)(1)
(1988 & Supp. 1992) (establishing the rule that for federal estate tax purposes, an interest
in property will only be included if the decedent retained the possession of, enjoyment of,
or right to income from the property); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.
1947) (holding that the power of a trustee to exercise income of a trust in favor of dece-
dent to maintain decedent at certain standard of living did not render the value of the trust
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Maine court has since addressed the issue in the context of the pre-
1990 UPC, and Professor Kurtz's prediction proved true.84 Although
not purely discretionary, in that the beneficiary was to be paid a fixed
sum per month, the trustee had sole discretion to pay any additional
income. Looking to the law of federal estate taxation for authority, the
court concluded that the amount over which the trustee had discretion
would not be included for purposes of the elective share because "the
potential interest is too remote and tenuous." 85 Under the 1990 UPC
this interest would be covered by the next section (sec-
tion 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B)) as a power exercisable by a nonadverse party.
2. Transfer With Retained Power-Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B)
This section includes in the augmented estate property that was
transferred by the decedent during marriage if a power to appoint it to
himself or his estate was retained by the decedent and held at death or
was exercised or released within two years of death. The property is
included if the power is exercisable by the decedent alone or in con-
junction with any other person or exercisable by a nonadverse party.
This section is broader than the corresponding section that applies
to powers created prior to marriage. First, it is not limited to presently
exercisable powers and therefore includes testamentary powers. Second,
it is not limited to powers held by the decedent alone. Thus, if H
transferred $100,000 "to T in trust to pay the income to A for life,
then to whomever H shall by will appoint," and H retained this power
at his death, the corpus would be included in H's augmented estate
under this section. Similarly, if H transferred $200,000 "to T in trust
to pay the income 'to A for life, then to whomever H shall appoint by
deed or will with the consent of X," and H retained this power at his
death, the corpus would be included in H's augmented estate under
this section.
includible in decedent's gross estate); Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049, 1061
(1975) (holding that receipt of funds from discretionary trust is not dispositive as to whether
settlor retained right to income from the property).
84. Estate of Fisher, 545 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1988).
85. Xd. at- 1273.
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Although the language of this section refers to "income or princi-
pal" subject to a power, the section certainly would not be construed
to be limited to transfers in trust. Thus, if during marriage the dece-
dent transferred Blackacre "to A for life, then to whomever I shall
appoint by will," and H retained this power at his death, Blackacre
would be included in the decedent's augmented estate under this sec-
tion.
Both the pre-1990 UPC and the federal estate tax counterparts to
this section are limited to powers that are exercisable by the decedent
alone or in conjunction with any other person.8 6 Here, the power is
included if it is "by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any
other person or exercisable by a nonadverse party, for the benefit of
the decedent or the decedent's estate."87 Thus, suppose that during
marriage to W, H transfers $100,000 "to T to invest for the benefit of
A for life, then to such of H or H's issue as T shall appoint." T, the
trustee, has a non-general power of appointment, and H is within the
scope of the permissible appointees. At H's death, the corpus will be
included in the augmented estate under this section, even though it is
excluded from H's gross estate and excluded from the pre-1990 UPC's
augmented estate.
3. Joint Tenancies Created Within Two Years of Death-
Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C)
This section includes in the augmented estate property, to the
extent of the decedent's contribution, acquired during marriage and
within two years of the decedent's death, that was owned by the dece-
86. "[A]ny transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of his death a
power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, to revoke or to consume, in-
vade or dispose of the principal for his own benefit." UPC § 2-202(1)(ii) (1983). See also
LR.C. § 2038 (1988).
87. UPC § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). A "nonadverse party" is
defined as 'a person who does not have a substantial beneficial interest in the trust or other
property arrangement that would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the
power that he [or she] possesses respecting the trust or other property arrangement. A per-
son having a general power of appointment over property is deemed to have a beneficial
interest in the property. Ia § 2-202(a)(1)(ii). See also I.R.C. § 672(a)-(b) (1988) (defining
"adverse party" and "nonadverse party" for federal income tax purposes).
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dent and a third party as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
Thus, if during marriage and within two years of death, H purchases
Blackacre for $100,000 putting title in the name of "H and A as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship," the full value of Blackacre will
be included in H's augmented estate under this section. As with the
other sections, Blackacre will be included whether decedent retained
his interest at his death or gratuitously transferred it prior to death.88
The amount that is included under this section is based on the
decedent's contribution. If, in the above example, H had contributed
half of the purchase price, then only half of the value of Blackacre
would be included in the augmented estate under this section. Howev-
er, if H contributed less than his pro rata share (in this case less than
50%), the full pro rata ownership interest share (50%) would be in-
cluded under section 2-202(b)(2)(ii). This is because section 2-202(d)
provides that if more than one section applies (as is the case here), the
property will be included in the augmented estate under the section
that yields the highest value.
Thus, there are two sections that deal with joint tenancies and
they are not mutually exclusive. Subsection (ii) applies to joint tenan-
cies whether created prior to or during marriage and whether created
by the decedent or a third party. Section (iv)(C) is limited to joint
88. This, of course, is limited to gratuitous transfers within two years of death, since
the section itself is limited to joint tenancies acquired within two years of death. The com-
parable section under the pre-1990 UPC, applied to "any transfer whereby property is held
at the time of the decedent's death by decedent and another with right of survivorship."
UPC § 2-202(1)(iii) (1983). Since the pre-1990 section applies to joint tenancy property cre-
ated by decedent at any time during marriage, it is actually broader than
§ 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C) of the 1990 UPC which applies only to such interests created during
marriage and within two years of the decedent's death. However when read in conjunction
with § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) which applies to joint tenancy property created by decedent or a third
party at any time, including prior to marriage, the net result is a much broader coverage
under the 1990 UPC. Nonetheless there are circumstances under which the surviving spouse
would be better off under'the old system than the new. Suppose H and W marry and one
year later, H contributes the entire $100,000 required to purchase Blackacre. H names
daughter Y as joint tenant with survivorship. If H dies ten years later, only $50,000 will be
included in H's augmented estate under the 1990 UPC. On the other hand, the entire
$100,000 would be included under the pre-1990 UPC because the earlier ,'ersion reclaims
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tenancies created by the decedent during marriage and within two
years of death. Thus, subsection (iv)(C) is actually a sub-class of sub-
section (ii), but the amount included under subsection (iv)(C) is based
on contribution, and the amount included in subsection (ii) is based on
the decedent's unilaterally severable interest. The former may or may
not be greater than the latter. In those cases where either measure is
applicable, section 2-202(d) breaks the tie by choosing the subsection
that yields the greater value to the augmented estate.89
In short, any property that falls within subsection (iv)(C) will also
fall within subsection (ii). The subsection that will apply will be deter-
mined by which is greater: decedent's unilaterally severable interest
(subsection (ii)), or the decedent's contribution (subsection (iv)(C)). In
the case of real property that falls within both, whenever the
decedent's contribution exceeds his pro rata share, the property will be
included under subsection (iv)(C). Whenever his contribution is less
than his proportional ownership interest share, the property will be
included under subsection (ii).
In the case of personal property, this same generalization cannot
be made, because the unilaterally severable interest depends on the law
of the particular jurisdiction.' In those jurisdictions where the unilat-
erally severable interest is based on contribution, the two sections will
yield the same value. Thus, suppose, within two years of death and
while married, H contributes three-fourths of the amount to a bank
account that he creates in the name of himself and A as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship. If the jurisdiction has enacted section
6-211 of the 1990 UPC, which provides that ownership during lifetime
is based on contribution, three-fourths of the bank account would be
included under either section.
Why is this section limited to joint tenancies created within two
years of death? One response is that subsection (ii) will catch joint
tenancies that are created more than two years before death, even
though the amount included will be limited to the decedent's propor-
tional ownership share. The real thrust, however, of this section is to
89. UPC § 2-202(d) (Supp. 1992).
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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prevent our would-be disinheritor from escaping the grasp of subsec-
tion (iv)(D) by creating a joint tenancy rather than making an outright
transfer.
4. Transfers Within Two Years of Death-
Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D)
This section includes "any transfer made to a donee within two
years before the decedent's death to the extent that the aggregate trans-
fers to any one donee in either of the years exceed $10,000. ' The
purpose of this section is to prevent the decedent from defeating the
spouse's elective share by simply giving property away in contempla-
tion of death. Of course, the statute is objective-there is no need for
a determination that the transfer was in fact in contemplation of death.
The $10,000 floor is to allow the decedent to take advantage of the
annual per donee federal gift tax exclusion.' In the case of a transfer
in trust, presumably the beneficiaries rather than the trustee would be
considered the donees for purposes of this section.9
5. Overlap Among the Subsections of 2-202(b)(2)(iv)
In the discussion of subsection (iv)(C) above, it was noted that at
times subsection (iv)(C) might overlap with subsection (ii) (joint tenan-
cies created prior to marriage or by someone other than the transferor).
There also is potential overlap within the subsections of (iv). Suppose
during marriage H transfers securities to his son S reserving the in-
come for life for himself. Suppose also that one year befor6 death, H
conveyed his life estate to his son. At H's death the value of the
securities would be included in the augmented estate under subsection
(iv)(A) because H had possession (enjoyment) within two years of
death. Thus, H's conveyance of the life estate to S does not take it
out of subsection (iv)(A), but it arguably also puts at least the life
91. UPC § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D) (Supp. 1992).
92. LR.C. § 2503(b) (1988).
93. This is the case for federal gift tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2(a) (as
amended in 1984); Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1033 (discussing the
ambiguity resulting from the drafter's failure to define "donee").
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estate into subsection (iv)(D) because he transferred it within two years
of death.94
Here we do not have a case that fits completely within the terms
of two sections. We have a case that fits completely within subsection
(iv)(A) or, alternatively, straddles subsection (iv)(A) and subsection
(iv)(D). The greater value rule requires that this transfer be included
under subsection (iv)(A) because the value under subsection (iv)(A)
would be the full value of the securities at the time of H's death. If
part is included under subsection (iv)(A) and part under subsection
(iv)(D), the $10,000 exclusion in subsection (iv)(D) would reduce the
amount included in the augmented estate.
Suppose that during marriage to W, H transfers Blackacre to his
daughter X, retaining a life estate, and that H dies within two years of
the transfer. This transfer fits within the terms of subsection (iv)(A) as
a transfer with a retained life estate and within the terms of subsection
(iv)(D) as a transfer (of the remainder) within two years of death.
Under subsection (iv)(A), the value included would be the value of
Blackacre at H's death. Under subsection (iv)(D), the value included
would be the value of the remainder at the time of the transfer less
the $10,000 exclusion. Thus, under the greater value rule, the transfer
would be included under subsection (iv)(A) unless, by some remote
chance the value of Blackacre has declined below the value of the
remainder, by more than $10,000, at the time of the transfer.
In short, because of the greater value rule, coupled with the
$10,000 exclusion in subsection (iv)(D), the property will be included
in one of the sections other than subsection (iv)(D), except in very
rare instances. Because of the rarity of those instances, perhaps it
would be advisable to avoid this issue altogether by drafting the statute
to prevent overlap within subsection (iv). For example, subsection
(iv)(D) could refer to "any transfer, other than a transfer within (A),
(B), or (C), made to a donee withiii two years of death to the extent
94. Of course, the value of the life estate will be relatively small. Because the calcu-
lations will be made after H's death, actualities rather than actuarials will be used. Thus,
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that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the years
exceed $10,000." This would not obviate the need for the greater value
rule, because it would still be needed, for example, to resolve a con-
flict between subsections (ii) and (iv)(C).
E. Nonprobate Transfers to the Surviving Spouse-
Section 2-202(b)(3)
This section continues the approach of the pre-1990 UPC of in-
cluding nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse in the augmented
estate. This inclusion prevents a major aspect of the overprotection
problem that plagued the traditional elective-share system. If the
spouse benefits from certain will substitutes, such as life insurance and
joint tenancies, this should be taken into consideration in determining
the elective-share entitlement. Under the 1990 UPC these assets are
included in this section, and then the spouse is credited with their
receipt in section 2-207.95
Because this section is limited to nonprobate transfers, it does not
include assets received from the decedent by will or by intestate suc-
cession. Similarly, it expressly excludes the homestead allowance,
exempt property, and the family allowance. With these exceptions, it
generally includes "the value of property to which the surviving spouse
succeeds by reason of the decedent's death."96 Examples are given
such as insurance and retirement benefits.
Suppose that H deposited $100,000 in a bank account in the name
of "H, pay on death td W." Assuming that such a "POD" bank ac-
count is valid in the jurisdiction, the assets in this account would be
included in the augmented estate under this section because this is
95. See discussion infra part V.C.
96. UPC § 2-202(b)(3) (Supp. 1992). The UPC defines "value of property to which
the surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death" to include:
the commuted value of any present or future interest then held by the surviving
spouse and the commuted value of amounts payable to the surviving spouse after
the decedent's death under any trust, life insurance settlement option, annuity con-
tract, public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit or retirement
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"property to which the surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the
decedent's death." It does not matter if the account was created before
or after H's marriage to W.
Although the examples listed in section 2-202(b)(3) are not intend-,
ed to be all-inclusive, it is nonetheless curious that joint tenancies are
not mentioned.97 Spouses often own assets, such as real estate, securi-
ties, and bank accounts, in joint tenancy form, making this one of the
most common ways that spouses avoid probate with regard to each
other. The pre-1990 UPC expressly included in the augmented estate
property owned by the decedent and the surviving spouse as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship.98 In most estates joint tenancy
property will, likely constitute the largest portion of property falling
within this subsection.
Since joint tenancies are not even mentioned, there obviously is no
indication of the amount of property that is deemed to pass to the
surviving spouse for purposes of inclusion in this section. Assume H
and W own Blackaere as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
After a long marriage, H dies survived by W, and at H's death,
Blackacre is worth $200,000. How much of Blackacre is deemed to
pass to Wi? One possible answer is all of it. Another choice is half, on
97. Early common-law theory of joint tenancy provided that during their joint lives
each tenant owned the whole, and nothing passed at death; rather the surviving joint tenant
was simply relieved of the participation of the other. It is hard to believe that the drafters
assumed that joint tenancies would not be included in this section on the basis of this theo-
ry. It has been recognized as a fiction and has been rejected for purposes of most joint
tenancy issues that arise. See I.R.C. § 2040(a) (1988) (including in the decedent's gross
estate the value of jointly held property with right of survivorship to the extent that the
decedent is unable to show contribution from the other joint tenants); I.R.C. § 2040(b)(l)-
(2) (1988) (restricting the applicability of § 2040(a) with respect to husbands and wives and
including in the decedent's estate one-half of the value of the property held by decedent
and surviving spouse with right of survivorship acquired after Dec. 31, 1976 regardless of
contribution); UPC § 2-202(2)(i) (1983) (expressly including survivorship property as prop-
erty derived from the decedent); Estate of Lettengarver, 813 P.2d 468, 472-73 (Mont. 1991)
(interpreting § 2-202(2)(i) of the pre-1990 UPC and holding that one-half of the value of
contract for deed held by decedent and surviving spouse with right of survivorship passed
to surviving spouse at decedent's death); Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at
1040-41.
98. UPC § 2-202(2)(i) (1983).
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the grounds that while H was living each owned an undivided one-
half. A third choice is none, on the basis of the common-law theory of
joint tenancy.' Finally, the amount deemed to pass can be based on
the percentage of the purchase price contributed by H.
The pre-1990 UPC provides that the amount deemed to pass to
the surviving spouse is based on contribution, but in the absence of
evidence of contribution, the presumption is that all passed."° In
other words, the pre-1990 UPC presumed that the decedent provided
all of the purchase price unless the surviving spouse can prove other-
wise. Not only is this presumption unfair, but it was drafted simply to
be consistent with the then existing transfer tax laws which have since
been changed. Under current tax law, the amount of spousal joint
tenancy property that is deemed to pass for transfer tax purposes is
half, regardless of contribution.'
Under the 1990 UPC the resolution of this issue will not matter in
a marriage of fifteen years or longer because whatever portion of the
joint tenancy property is not included in section 2-202(b)(3) will be
included in section 2-202(b)(4) (the value of property owned by the
surviving spouse at the decedent's death). If the marriage is fifteen
years or longer, the surviving spouse will be charged in section 2-207
with the full amount included under section 2-202(b)(3) and the full
amount under section 2-202(b)(4). Therefore, it makes no difference
how much of the joint tenancy property is included in subsection (3)
and how much is included in subsection (4).
However, the amounts included in subsections (3) and (4) can
make a difference in a less-than-fifteen year marriage because of the
section 2-207 crediting procedure described above. Suppose, for exam-
99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
100. UPC § 2-202(2)(iii) (1983).
101. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(1) (1988). Although the marital deduction allowed under I.R.C.
§ 2056(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992) is unlimited, calculating the amount deemed to pass to the
surviving spouse will have other tax, consequences related to subsequent transfers by the
surviving spouse. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1988) (describing the special rules governing the basis
of property received by virtue of another person's death); Drake v. United States, 642 F.
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ple, that H's estate plus reclaimables equals $400,000 and that H and
W owned Blackacre (worth $100,000) as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship. Suppose also that W does not own any property other
than her interest in Blackacre and that H devises her nothing. Their
combined augmented estates equals $500,000. If they have been mar-
ried long enough for the percentage entitlement to be, say, 20%, then
W's elective-share entitlement is $100,000. If all of Blackacre is in-
cluded under section 2-202(b)(3) (i.e., all is deemed to pass to W from
H), then W is credited with all of it under section 2-207(a)(2). This
gives her no deficit and, thus, no further entitlement under her elective
share.
On the other hand, if half is deemed to pass to W (so that
$50,000 is included under section 2-202(b)(3)) and W is deemed to
already own the other half (so that $50,000 is included under section
2-202(b)(4)), then W will be credited with $50,000 under section
2-207(2) and $20,000 (40% of $50,000) under section 2-207(4). Ac-
cording to these calculations, her entitlement of $100,000 minus her
credits of $70,000 leave her a deficit of $30,000. Thus, under her
elective share, W is entitled to an additional $30,000 which would be
satisfied by reducing the shares of H's other beneficiaries.
In sum, in a less-than-fifteen year marriage it hurts the surviving
spouse to assume that all of the joint tenancy property passed to him
or her from the decedent. For property (other than a joint bank ac-
count) owned by H and W as joint tenants or tenant by the entirety,
half should be included under section 2-202(b)(3) and half under sec-
tion 2-202(b)(4). This is consistent with the fact that each owns half
while they are both alive. In the case of a joint bank account, howev-
er, ownership is based on contribution. Thus, the amount that is
deemed to pass to the surviving spouse should be the amount contrib-
uted by the decedent. The remaining portion should be included under
section 2-202(b)(4) as an asset of the surviving spouse." 2
102. Professor Waggoner stated in a telephone conversation on Nov. 18, 1992 that this
is consistent with the intent of the drafters and that this will be clarified in the comments.
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F. Assets and Reclaimables of the Surviving Spouse-
Section 2-202(b)(4)
This section, which represents a significant change from the pre-
1990 Code, includes the assets of the surviving spouse in the augment-
ed estate."0 3 As explained earlier, this is necessary in order to ap-
proximate a community property system."4 Also included in the aug-
mented estate are any nonprobate transfers that would have been in-
cluded as reclaimables under section 2-202(b)(2) had the surviving
spouse been the first to die. Thus, if W transferred $100,000 into a
revocable trust, the value of the corpus at H's death would be included
as a reclaimable of W's under this section. Life insurance, however, is
not valued as if W had died. In other words, if W owns a life insur-
ance policy naming her child C as beneficiary, the face amount of the
policy would not be included under this section. The comment to this
section suggest that insurance be valued according to federal tax ta-
bles.10 5
Executors, administrators, and those who advise them are accus-
tomed to valuing the assets of the decedent, because such valuing has
always been part of the estate administration process. They are not,
however, accustomed to valuing the assets of the surviving spouse. The
fact that the asset owner is still living creates some problems that do
not exist when valuing a decedent's estate. For example, if the surviv-
ing spouse is the life tenant of a trust, the life estate will have to be
valued.
103. UPC § 2-204(b)(4) (Supp. 1992). This section includes in the augmented estate
"the value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death" which is
defined as:
the commuted value of any present or future interest then held by the surviving
spouse and the commuted value of amounts payable to the surviving spouse after
the decedent's death under any trust, life insurance settlement option, annuity con-
tract, public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit or retirement
plan, or any similar arrangement, exclusive of the federal Social Security system.
Id § 2-202(a)(1)(vi).
104. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
105. Specifically, the comment states that it could be valued under the method used in
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Those who enjoy creating a parade of horrors will quickly imagine
a greedy, or simply vindictive, spouse depleting the estate with valua-
tion costs even when a deficit is unlikely. If this is a significant con-
cern, an enacting state could consider adding a provision that would
deter such conduct. For example, a provision could be enacted that
requires the surviving spouse, rather than the estate, to bear the burden
of appraisal costs upon a finding of no probable cause to elect. This
would prevent the spouse from being able to intentionally deplete the
shares of the others by way of a futile election.
Once the initial premise, that including the assets of the surviving
spouse is a necessary part of the scheme, is accepted, it should be
recognized that the problems are not insurmountable. The concept is
not totally new since equitable distribution requires that the assets of
living persons be valued. Furthermore, it will only be required in a
small percentage of estates, because only a small percentage of surviv-
ing spouses are devised less than, or even close to, the minimum enti-
tlement. A rough approximation of the value of assets will usually
reveal that there is no deficit, and appraisals, therefore, will rarely be
required. Even among those estates where the spouse is devised less
than the entitlement, not every spouse will choose to elect.
There will, of course, be some valuation issues. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that surviving spouse W is the income beneficiary of a discre-
tionary trust created by her mother. If the corpus of the trust consists
of $500,000, but payments of income to W are purely within the dis-
cretion of the trustee, it is difficult to value W's interest for purposes
of inclusion in the augmented estate. However, this issue has been
litigated in the context of equitable distribution and in the context of
determining if the trust is "medicaid qualifying." In those contexts, the
purely discretionary trust has been found to have no value, and the
result will likely be the same in an elective-share context. Of course, a
presumption of no value could be rebutted by evidence of an under-
standing between the settlor and the trustee that there would be a
certain amount periodically paid to the beneficiary.
It should be kept in mind that the "reclaimables" of the surviving
spouse are not assets that would ever need to be recalled. These are
simply assets whose values are taken into consideration for purposes of
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determining if the spouse is entitled to reach the decedent's
reclaimables. In other words, a donee will not have to be concerned
about the health and well being of the donor's spouse. If the donor's
spouse dies within two years of the transfer, the value of the asset will
enter into the computation, but the donee will not be required to con-
tribute, regardless of the outcome of the computation."°6
It is fair to take the surviving spouse's nonprobate assets into
account just as it is fair to take the nonprobate assets of the decedent
into account since the premise that these are in substance owned assets
applies just as well to one as it des to the other. Suppose that during
marriage, W purchased Blackacre for $100,000 putting title in the
name of "W and X as joint tenants with the right of survivorship." If
H lives more than two years after the purchase of Blackacre and then
dies, survived by W, $50,000 will be included as a reclaimable of W
under this section because, had she died first, it would have been
included under section 2-202(b)(2)(ii). If H dies within two years of
the purchase of Blackacre, then under the "greater value" rule,
$100,000 will be included as a reclaimable of W under this section,
because the amount included would be based on contribution under
section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C). The inclusion of this amount, whether it is
$50,000 or $100,000, counts against W because she will be credited
with all or a portion of it under section 2-207. However, this is not
unfair even if $100,000 is included because H died within two years
of the purchase of Blackacre. Although this is more than her unilater-
ally severable interest, she has in effect given half of Blackacre to X
within two years of H's death and she owns the other half.
G. Exclusions-Section 2-202(c)
Any transfer or any exercise or release of a power of appoint-
ment'0 7 is excluded from the decedent's reclaimable estate (i) to the
106. This would not be the case, however, if a "community property at death" system
were in force. If it were, and if the calculations revealed that the surviving spouse owned
more than her share, then the estate of the decedent would have a claim against the surviv-
ing spouse and her reclaimables would have to be reachable. See supra note 21 and accom-
panying text.
107. The actual wording of UPC § 2-202(c) is "[a]ny transfer or exercise or release of
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extent that the decedent received adequate and full consideration or (ii)
if irrevocably made with the written consent or joinder of the surviv-
iug spouse." 8 Thus, the elective-share provisions are intended to
reach only gratuitous transfers rather than property that has been sold
to a third party. The second exclusion allows both spouses to make the
transfer and thus assure the donee and the testator that the property
will not later be recalled to satisfy the elective share. This consent or
joinder provision is in addition to section 2-204 provisions that allow
the elective-share right to be waived by an express contract executed
before or after marriage.
Professor Kurtz, in his discussion of the pre-1990 Code, questions
whether the "adequate and full consideration" should be valued at the
time of the transfer or at the time of the decedent's death. He hypoth-
esizes a revocable trust created by the decedent that has a corpus
consisting of $200,000 worth of securities created in exchange for
$100,000. By the time the decedent dies, both the corpus and the
securities received have doubled in value. The provisions require that
the trust be valued as of decedent's death, but Professor Kurtz asks at
what point the consideration is valued.
This unrealistic hypothetical confuses the ultimate issue. Revocable
trusts are not usually "sold." If there is any reasonable chance that the
power to revoke will be exercised, who would be willing to buy it?
Professor Kurtz assumes the transfer was for less than adequate con-
sideration, but if the power retained is legitimate, the $100,000 worth
of securities would seem to be more than adequate. During the
settlor's lifetime, the beneficiary's interest in a revocable trust is worth
nothing or something close to nothing. Although the beneficiary's
interest arguably has some value if the settlor has no intention to
exercise the power, in that case the settlor might as well make the
trust irrevocable which will keep it out of the augmented estate unless
a life estate has been retained and the trust was created during mar-
riage.
a power of appointment"; but this, of course, is not intended to be limited exclusively to
powers. In other words, the statute obviously means any transfer or any exercise or release
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The issue of valuing consideration can be presented in a more
realistic setting. Suppose that during marriage to the surviving spouse,
the decedent transferred Blackacre to X reserving a life estate and that
X paid the decedent $100,000 for this remainder. At the time of the
transfer, the value of X's remainder was $150,000. Blackacre will be
included in the augmented estate under section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A) as a
transfer with retained life estate, and its value will be measured at the
time of the decedent's death which is, say, $200,000. But the amount
that is included is the extent to which the value exceeds "full and
adequate consideration." This phrase should be interpreted to mean that
the value included be $200,000 minus $100,000 invested for the period
between the time of the transfer and the decedent's death."°9 As Pro-
fessor Kurtz notes: "The spouse then benefits from appreciation on the
transferred property but does not benefit from the appreciation on the
consideration, which would not have accrued to the estate if no trans-
fer had been made."110
Property is excluded from the augmented estate by this section if
"irrevocably made with the written consent or joinder of the surviving
spouse." This provision assures the spouse-transferor and his or her
recipient that the asset will not have to be recalled if there is consent
or a waiver by the other spouse. It is likely that this method of exclu-
sion, on an asset by asset basis, will be used more frequently than a
pre- or postmarital agreement that waives the entire elective share.
There is concern, however, for what constitutes such consent or
waiver. Should the document specifically refer to the signer's intent to
109. This would be offset by the amount of predicted inflation taken into account by
the valuation table from which the $150,000 is derived.
110. Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1020. A similar problem of
insufficient consideration arises with respect to federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 2043 applies to
any inter vivos less-than-full-consideration transfer which is includible in the decedent's
gros.k estate. Section 2043 provides that the consideration is valued at the time of the trans-
fer even though the value of the property transferred is to be measured at the time of the
decedent's death. See United States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1968) (measuring the
value of a life estate in certain stock, used as consideration for a remainder interest in
similar stock owned by the decedent, at the time of the transfer, despite the fact that the
life interest in the stock in fact yielded more to the decedent than the mortality tables pre-
dicted at the moment of transfer); United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 14 (9th Cir. 1965)
(stating that consideration is to be measured at the time of the transfer).
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exclude the asset from the augmented estate? If the spouse signs a
split-gift agreement for federal gift tax purposes, does this constitute
consent for purposes of this section? In jurisdictions that still have
common-law or statutory dower, joining in a transfer of real property
has become so commonplace that it is virtually automatic, often with
no questions asked. It is problematic to presume that such a procedur-
ally customary joinder constitutes an informed waiver of rights that
otherwise would accrue to the surviving spouse under these provisions.
Although releasing dower probably is not an informed act for the same
reason, the protection afforded by dower has come to be viewed as so
insignificant that the concern for informing those who release it has
correspondingly diminished.
This issue could be resolved by a clarification in this section
about what qualifies (or does not qualify) as consent or joinder. The
concern that will need to be balanced is that the requirements may
have the effect of defeating an intended waiver."'
H. Valuation-Section 2-202(d)
This provision has been discussed in conjunction with several of
the previous sections. It provides that property is to be valued at the
decedent's death, but property irrevocably transferred within two years
of the decedent's death that is reclaimable under subsections
2-202(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iv) is valued as of the time of the transfer.
This section also anticipates the possibility that a transfer might fall
within more than one subsection of 2-202(b)(2), and breaks the tie by
requiring inclusion under the section that yields the highest value."'
Finally, it defines an irrevocable transfer for purposes of this section to
include an irrevocable exercise or release of a power of appointment.
111. A draft of these provisions currently being considered by the North Carolina Bar
Association adds a provision that an election under I.R.C. § 2513 does not in and of itself
constitute written consent or joinder for purposes of this section. Minutes from the Elective
Share Sub-committee of the Legislative Committee of the Estate Planning and Fiduciary
Law Section of the North Carolina Bar Association (Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with author).
112. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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I. Crediting and Contribution-Section 2-207
Along with sections 2-201 and 2-202(b), this section represents the
core of the elective-share provisions. These three are the most impor-
tant sections because they contain all of the substantive mechanics of
the process. Once "the elective-share amount is ascertained by applying
the fraction in section 2-201 to the augmented estate that is computed
under section 2-202(b), the crediting or charging process in section
2-207(a) is undertaken in order to determine if there is a deficit or
balance due to the surviving spouse. Sections 2-207(b) and (c) contain
the contribution procedure in the event that section 2-207(a) reveals a
deficit or in the event that the surviving spouse is entitled to a supple-
mental elective-share amount under section 2-201(b).
1. Section 2-207(a)
The crediting process in section 2-207(a) is fashioned with the
goal of preserving the testator's scheme as much as possible. Once the
elective-share amount is ascertained, four items in section 2-207(a) are
applied first toward its satisfaction. If the sum of the amounts included
in these four items is equal to or greater than the elective-share
amount, then no contribution will be required by the other beneficiaries
of the decedent's probate and nonprobate estate. 3 unless the surviv-
ing spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount under
section 2-201(b).
If the sum is less than the entitlement, then contribution by the
other beneficiaries will be required. With the exception of donees of
irrevocable transfers made within two years of death, there is no prior-
ity among beneficiaries. Devisees named in the testator's will (probate
estate beneficiaries) are not preferred over nonprobate beneficiaries.
They all contribute their shares proportional to their interest in the
decedent's reclaimable estate.114 This equal treatment is consistent
113. As previously noted, the surviving spouse is not required to reimburse the estate.
This would be required if the system carried the principle of community property to its
extreme. See supra note 21.
114. UPC § 2-207(b) (Supp. 1992).
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with the underlying rationale of augmentation-namely, that the dece-
dent should be treated as the owner of the nonprobate assets because
of his lifetime control of them, just as he is treated as the owner of
the probate assets.
Item one credits the surviving spouse with assets that pass to him
or her by testate or intestate succession. Thus, if H devises $50,000 to
W, and W's elective-share entitlement is $100,000, the devise will be
applied first to satisfy her share. This reduces the amount that needs to
be satisfied by $50,000. If H devised Blackacre to W for life, the
value of W's life estate will have to be ascertained for purposes of this
calculation.
115
Item two credits the surviving spouse with the nonprobate transfers
payable to the surviving spouse. The rationale for this crediting, which
is not new to the 1990 UPC,116 is that the surviving spouse should
not be allowed to disrupt the testator's scheme if he or she benefits
sufficiently from will substitutes, such as life insurance and joint ten-
ancies. Thus, this section cures the traditional overprotection problem.
The assets that are credited here are the assets included under section
2-202(b)(3). If W's elective-share entitlement is $200,000 and if W
received $100,000 in life insurance proceeds payable on the life of H,
then $100,000 will be applied toward the satisfaction of W's elective
share under this section.
Item three credits the surviving spouse with amounts in the aug-
mented estate that would have passed to the surviving spouse but were
disclaimed. Thus, if W's elective-share entitlement is $200,000 and W
disclaims a life estate in Blackacre that H devised to her, she is cred-
115. The pre-1990 UPC provided that the value of a life estate would be one-half the
value of the property subject to the life estate unless proved otherwise. UPC § 2-207(a)
(1983). See also id. § 2-207 cmt.; Estate of Fisher, 545 A.2d 1266, 1273 (Me. 1988) (al-
lowing surviving spouse to rebut the presumption that life estate was worth one-half of the
total value of the property by using standard mortality tables and Internal Revenue Service
Regulations); Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1038-39. No such presump-
tion exists for life interests transferred to surviving spouse under the 1990 UPC. For a
general discussion of valuation problems related to transfers of life interests to a surviving
spouse see Bloom, Trust and Other Partial Interests, supra note 33. See Langbein &
Waggoner, The New UPC, supra note 35.
116. The pre-1990 UPC did the same. UPC § 2-207(a) (1983).
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ited under this section with the value of the life estate. The effect of
charging the value of the disclaimed property against the surviving
spouse is that no disclaimers will be filed." 7 Again, the rationale for
this is to preserve testator's scheme, but it has proved to be a contro-
versial provision both here and under the pre-1990 UPC."
8
Item four credits the surviving spouse with the applicable percent-
age of property included in the. augmented, estate under sec-
tion 2-202(b)(4) (assets owned by the surviving spouse plus
reclaimables). The "applicable percentage" is twice the elective-share
percentage based on the length of the marriage as provided in the
table in section 2-201. This credits the surviving spouse with the
amount of "marital property" that he or she already owns." 9 For ex-
ample, if W's assets are valued at $100,000, and the elective-share per-
centage is 20%, W will be credited with 40% of $100,000, or,
$40,000.
In sum, section 2-207(a) applies voluntary probate and nonprobate
transfers first toward the satisfaction of the elective share. Then dis-
claimed property is charged. Finally, the amount of "marital property"
that the surviving spouse is deemed to already own is charged. If there
is no deficit, the process stops unless the surviving spouse is entitled
to a supplemental elective-share amount. If there is a deficit or an
entitlement to a supplemental share, sections 2-207(b) and (c) provide
for contribution to satisfy the deficit or the supplemental share or both.
2. Section 2-207(b)
If contribution is required, the shares of the other beneficiaries of
the decedent's probate estate and reclaimables are reduced. Since this
reduction is contrary to the testator's intent, these are "involuntary
transfers" to the surviving spouse. This section provides that the other
beneficiaries, with the exception of donees of irrevocable transfers
117. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text following note 36. See also UPC art. II, pt. 2 cmt. (Supp.
1992) (describing the step by step procedure for satisfying the elective share under various
circumstances and offering justifications for the methods employed).
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made within two years of death, contribute shares proportional to their
interest in the decedent's reclaimable estate. In other words, they will
receive the same fractional interest of the augmented estate reduced by
the deficit as they would have received had there been no deficit.
Thus, suppose the decedent's probate estate plus reclaimables equals
$1,200,000 and that there is a deficit of $300,000. Assume also that
decedent had devised $400,000. to X and named Y the beneficiary of a
revocable trust with a corpus of $800,000. Their respective proportion-
al shares of the augmented estate are one-third and two-thirds. The
augmented estate reduced by the deficit is $900,000. Thus, X will
receive one-third (or $300,000) and the corpus of Y's trust will be
reduced to $600,000.
3. Section 2-207(c)
If there is still a deficit after all of the shares of the other benefi-
ciaries have been exhausted, then the donees of irrevocable transfers
within two years of death are required to contribute. Presumably one
reason for this layer of priority is to reduce the number of times that
assets will have to be reached that have already been paid to a donee.
With the other reclaimables, such as life insurance and revocable
trusts, the payor (life insurance company or bank) will likely receive
notice of the election before the asset is distributed to the beneficiary.
Another justification is' that since these are "no strings attached" trans-
fers, they should be treated favorably. If there is more than one donee
of an irrevocable transfer within two years of death, they contribute
their proportional shares in the same way described above as the other
beneficiaries.
The trade off for this layer of priority are the attendant complica-
tions. It is possible for the decedent, within two years of death, to
intentionally prioritize the beneficiaries of reclaimables by converting
some of the nonprobate transfers into irrevocable transfers. For exam-
ple, suppose that H created a revocable trust, naming X the beneficia-
ry. The corpus of the trust would be includible in H's augmented
estate under section 2-202(b)(2)(i) or under section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B)
if created during marriage, and X would not be a "priority donee."
However, if H releases the power within two years of death, he has
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made an irrevocable transfer within two years of death, the effect of
which would be to make X a priority donee. Concededly, H could
make anyone a priority donee simply by giving him or her property
within two years of death; but he can also do some last minute
prioritizing even if he has nothing left to give away.
Suppose H transfers Blackacre to his daughter Y, retaining a life
estate. If H dies within two years of transferring the remainder to Y,
the transfer falls within the terms of both section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A), as
a transfer with retained life estate, and section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D), as a
transfer within two years of death. Under the greater value rule,
Blackacre would be includible under section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A) because
of the $10,000 exclusion in section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D). Nonetheless, it
is still an irrevocable transfer within two years of death and, thus, fits
the description in section 2-207(b) of a priority transfer. This is incon-
sistent with the notion that a priority transfer is a "no strings attached"
transfer.
These complications would be avoided if section 2-207(b) were
amended (or interpreted) to limit priority transfers to section
2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D) transfers. A further clarification would be to amend
(or interpret) (iv)(D) to be limited to irrevocable transfers.
120
4. Section 2-207(d)
This section provides that only original recipients and their donees,
to the extent that the donees have the property or its proceeds, are
liable for contribution. Another section (section 2-202(f)) protects those
who purchase property from a recipient for value and without notice.
If X receives $10,000 within two years of the decedent's death, and if
prior to a request for contribution, X has given the $10,000 to Y, then
X and Y (if he still has the money) are liable for contribution. Presum-
ably the normal rules of joint and several liability would apply here. If
120. A draft of these provisions currently being considered by the North Carolina Bar
Association limits priority transfers to (iv)(D) transfers and limits (iv)(D) transfers to irrevo-
cable transfers. Minutes from the Elective Share Sub-committee of the Legislative Committee
of the Estate Planning and Fiduciary Law Section of the North Carolina Bar Association
(Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with author).
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X pays $10,000 to the decedent's surviving spouse, X should have a
cause of action against Y for contribution, and Y would be liable to
the extent that he still has the money.121 If X is judgment proof and
Y had used the money to purchase a car, presumably the car consti-
tutes "proceeds." If X is judgment proof and Y lost the money in Las
Vegas, the surviving spouse probably cannot recover it, even if Y has
$10,000 in a bank account back home.
This section also provides that a person liable for contribution
may choose to give up a proportional part of the property or the value
of the portion for which he or she is liable. Thus, in those instances
where the value of the asset has decreased, the donee can cut his or
her losses by returning all or a portion of the asset, rather than paying
the value that was included in the augmented estate. This could hap-
pen, for example, with shares of stock irrevocably transferred within
two years of death. The value included in the augmented estate is the
value of the stock at the time of the transfer." If the value has
dropped by the time the donee is required to contribute, the donee can
choose to return a portion or all of the stock, if he or she still retains
it, rather than pay the higher value.
J. Waiver of Rights-Section 2-204
Section 2-204 allows a couple to opt out of the elective-share
provisions by a written contract, agreement, or waiver -executed before
or after marriage. The agreement may wholly or partially waive the
right of election, the homestead allowance, exempt property, and the
family allowance. This section provides an effective response to the
argument that there will be couples whose economics deviate signifi-
cantly from the presumed economics underlying this system. There is
always the choice to be governed otherwise. As Langbein and
Waggoner more colorfully state in their seminal article, "Forced share
law is not Yuppie Law .... Indeed, under existing law serious
121. Professor Kurtz raises this issue in his discussion of the counterpart section in the
pre-1990 UPC. Kurtz, Augmented Estate Concept, supra note 9, at 1048-49.
122. UPC § 2-202(d) (Supp. 1992).
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Yuppies will contract out of the forced-share system by means of a
premarital agreement.99
123
Subsection (b) provides some safeguards for the surviving spouse
who has signed a waiver. In general, it is not enforceable if the sur-
viving spouse proves that it was not signed voluntarily or if it was
unconscionable when executed and the surviving spouse was not pro-
vided fair and reasonable disclosure. The comment states that this
section incorporates the standards by which the validity of a premarital




Section 2-205 contains the time limit and other procedural rules
for exercising the elective share. Subsection (a) provides that, unless
an extension is granted under subsection (b), the election must be
made within nine months of the decedent's death or within six months
after the probate of the decedent's will, whichever is later. The elec-
tion is made by filing a petition with the court and mailing or deliver-
ing it to the personal representative of the decedent's estate, if there is
one. The surviving spouse is required to give notice of the scheduled
hearing to those interested in the estate, including any beneficiaries
whose interests would be adversely affected by an election.
Except as provided in subsection (b), the reclaimables that are
described in section 2-202(b)(2) are not included in the estate for the
purpose of computing the elective share unless the petition is filed
within nine months of the decedent's death. Thus, for purposes of
reaching reclaimables, there is a time limit of nine months for peti-
123. Langbein and Waggoner, Forced Share, supra note 1, at 307. In states where the
Pre-1990 UPC has been enacted, the validity of antenuptial agreements has been litigated.
See In re Estate of Lopata v. Mettel, 641 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1982) (upholding the validity of
an antenuptial agreement between surviving spouse and decedent which prevented surviving
spouse from taking an elective share); In re Estate of Aspenson, 470 N.W.2d 692 (Minn.
1991) (upholding the substantive and procedural fairness of antenuptial agreement made
between decedent and surviving spouse who enjoyed equal bargaining power at the time of
the agreement).
124. UPC § 2-204 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
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tioning, unless an extension is granted under subsection (b). If an
extension is not granted, the reclaimables cannot be reached after nine
months, but the probate assets can be reached if the petition is filed
within six months after the probate of the decedent's will.
Subsection (b) provides that within nine months after the
decedent's death, the surviving spouse may petition the court for an
extension of time for making an election. If the surviving spouse gives
notice to interested parties within nine months and cause is shown, the
court may extend the time. If the extension is granted and the surviv-
ing spouse complies with the procedural requirements within the time
allowed by the extension, the reclaimables are not excluded from the
augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective-share and
supplemental elective-share amounts.
Subsection (c) provides that the surviving spouse may withdraw
his or her demand for an elective share at any time before entry of a
final determination by the court. 5
Subsection (d) provides that after notice and hearing, the court
determines the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts
and orders its payment from assets in the augmented estate or by
contribution under the section 2-207 provisions. If there is an asset
that cannot or has not yet been acquired by the personal representative,
the court may nonetheless fix the liability of any person interested in
the asset or who has possession of the asset.
The last sentence of this subsection (d) states: "The proceeding
may be maintained against fewer than all persons against whom relief
could be sought, but no person is subject to contribution in any greater
amount than he [or she] would have been under Section 2-207 had
125. The members of North Carolina Elective Share Sub-committee amended the lan-
guage of § 2-205(c) by adding a provision to protect the decedent's estate from bad faith
elections. "If after a withdrawal of demand by the surviving spouse or entry of a final
determination by the court, the court determines that the surviving spouse had no reasonable
basis for filing a petition, the cost of valuing the surviving spouse's property under Section
2-202(b)(3) shall be assessed against the surviving spouse." Minutes from the Elective Share
Sub-committee of The Legislative Committee of The Estate Planning and Fiduciary Law
Section of The North Carolina Bar Association (Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with author).
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relief been secured against all persons subject to contribution."12 6
Thus, the surviving spouse can choose whose assets are to be brought
into the augmented estate, but the beneficiaries whose shares are
brought in will not have their liability increased to compensate for
those assets that are voluntarily excluded by the surviving spouse. This
provision allows the surviving spouse to keep intact the part of the
testator's estate plan with which the surviving spouse is in agreement.
If the surviving spouse were required to maintain the action against all
of the beneficiaries, the surviving spouse could simply transfer the
assets to the approved beneficiaries after receiving the elective share.
This subsection obviates the need for that extra step.
L Election Personal to Surviving Spouse; Incapacitated Surviving
Spouse-Section 2-203
Section 2-203(a) provides that the election must be made by or on
behalf of a living surviving spouse. The right to elect does not survive
the death of the surviving spouse even if he or she dies before the
time has elapsed to make an election. This provision is consistent with
the notion that the right to elect is to personally benefit the surviving
spouse. However, it is inconsistent with the contribution rationale. If
the surviving spouse has "earned" half of the marital property, he or
she should be able to choose his or her successors in interest. This is
one of several instances that the support rationale competes with the
contribution rationale. The drafters chose the support rationale to over-
ride when the surviving spouse dies within a relatively short period
after the death of the predeceased spouse.
Subsection (a) also provides that if the election is not made by the
surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviving
spouse's behalf by his or her conservator, guardian, or agent under the
authority of a power of attorney.127 The main application of this pro-
126. UPC § 2-205(d) (Supp. 1992).
127. Under the 1969 UPC, the right of election could only be exercised on behalf of
an incapacitated surviving spouse by order of the court. "In the case of a protected person,
the right of election may be exercised only by order of the court in which protective pro-
ceedings as to his property are pending, after finding that exercise is necessary to provide
adequate support for the protected person during his probable life expectancy." UPC
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vision will be an election that is made on behalf of an incapacitated
surviving spouse.
Subsections (b) and (c) and alternative subsection (b) deal with
elections that are made on behalf of an incapacitated surviving spouse.
Subsections (b) and (c), which are intended to be enacted in states that
have enacted the Uniform Custodial Trusts Act, require that a portion
of the elective share be paid into a custodial trust. Alternative subsec-
tion (b)i which is intended to be enacted in states that have not enact-
ed the Uniform Custodial Trusts Act, requires that the court appoint a
trustee to administer a support trust. Otherwise, the thrust of subsec-
tions (b) and (c) and alternative subsection (b) are the same.
In short, if the surviving spouse is incapacitated, the portion of the
elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the
decedent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable
estate under Section 2-207(b) and (c) are administered by a trustee. If
an election is made by the guardian or conservator of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse is by definition incapacitated. If the elec-
tion is made by an agent under a durable power of attorney, the elec-
tion is presumed to be made on behalf of an incapacitated surviving
spouse.
128
The portion of the elective share that is to be administered by a
trustee under this section is limited to the "involuntary transfers," that
is, the assets that the other beneficiaries of the decedent's probate and
nonprobate estate are required to contribute. 129 Amounts that the de-
cedent voluntarily transferred to the surviving spouse by way of pro-
bate and nonprobate transfers are not subject to being administered by
the trust. 30 This leaves the testator's estate plan intact by not dis-
§ 2-203 (1983). For a recent case applying these provisions of the 1969 UPC, see In re
Estate of Wentworth, 452 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
128. UPC § 2-203(c) & alternative subsection (b) (Supp 1992).
129. These are the transfers due under § 2-207(b) & (c).
130. This includes anything that passes to the surviving spouse by intestacy. This is
.voluntary" in the sense that the decedent did not choose to be governed by anything other
than the default rules.
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mantling, for example, a testamentary trust that qualifies for the federal
estate tax marital deduction.
31
Expenditures may be made by the trustee without court order.'32
During incapacity, neither the surviving spouse nor anyone acting on
behalf of the surviving spouse has the power to terminate the trust, but
if the surviving spouse regains capacity he or she has the power to
terminate the trust.1 33 Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the
trustee is required to pay any unexpended trust property in the follow-
ing order: (i) under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the
predeceased spouse, as if the predeceased spouse died immediately
after the surviving spouse; or (ii) to the predeceased spouse's heirs
inder section 2-711 of the UPC.'
34
Section 2-711, which is not part of the elective-share provisions,
provides that the heirs will be ascertained as if the ancestor died at the
time of distribution. Thus, if the property is distributed under this
provision, the heirs of the predeceased spouse will be ascertained as if
the predeceased spouse died immediately after the death of the surviv-
ing spouse. The purpose of section 2-711 is to avoid disinheriting a
line of the decedent's descendants and to avoid passing property
through the estates of deceased persons. 35 States that do not enact
section 2-711 along with the elective-share provisions should draft
section 2-203 to provide that the property be distributed under (ii)1
36
to the predeceased spouses's heirs as if the predeceased spouse died
immediately after the surviving spouse. For the same reason, the death
131. UPC § 2-203 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
132. Ma § 2-203(c)(2) & alternative (b)(1).
133. Id § 2-203 (c)(1) & alternative (b)(2).
134. Id § 2-203(c)(3) & alternative (b)(3).
135. For example, assume H dies, survived by W who is incapacitated. At the time of
H's death, H had two children, A and B. Assume also that A has two children, X and Y,
who are grandchildren of H. A dies devising all to friend F. Then W dies with unexpended
funds in the trust created pursuant to § 2-203. Under the traditional rule of ascertaining
heirs as of the death of the ancestor, H's heirs would be W, A, and B. X and Y are "disin-
herited" by A's will. And since W and A are dead, their property passes through their es-
tates to their respective heirs or' devisees. Under § 2-203, the ascertainment of H's heirs is
deferred. They are ascertained as if H dies immediately after W. Thus, H's heirs are X, Y,
and B.
136. UPC § 2-203(c)(3)(ii) & alternative § 2-203(b)(3)(ii) (Supp. 1992).
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of the predeceased spouse is also hypothetically deferred for purposes
of distributing the unexpended portion of the trust property under the
residuary clause in (i).137
The comments explain:
The purpose of subsections (b) and (c), generally speaking, is to as-
sure that that part of the elective share is devoted to the personal econom-
ic benefit and needs of the surviving spouse, but not to the economic
benefit of the surviving spouse's heirs or devisees.138
Thus, if the trust that is created for the incapacitated surviving
spouse contains more than is required for the use of the surviving
spouse as determined by the trustee, the unexpended portion in effect
reverts to the predeceased spouse and is distributed to his or her heirs
or devisees. Once again, the support rationale overrides the contribu-
tion rationale in the context of an incapacitated surviving spouse. Only
if the surviving spouse consciously makes an election on his or her
own behalf is the surviving spouse able to choose the successors in in-
terest to the property. Otherwise, the use of the property is limited to
the lifetime needs of the surviving spouse.
In short, the predeceased spouse's intent is preserved to a greater
extent if the election is made on behalf of an incapacitated spouse.
This partial preservation is supported in part by the fact that the sur-
viving spouse may not have chosen to elect had he or she not lacked
capacity. Although statistics are not available, it is fair to assume that
some surviving spouses approve of their deceased spouses' estate plans
and do not elect even if they could take more by electing, especially
in second marriages.
Why is the unexpended portion distributed to the residuary
devisees or the heirs even when the property may have been derived
solely or in part from contributions by nonprobate beneficiaries of the
decedent? Another choice would be to distribute it to the beneficiaries
of the augmented estate who were required to contribute, with the
distributions to be made in proportion to their respective contributions.
137. 1l § 2-203(c)(3)(i) & alternative § 2-203(b)(3)(i).
138. Id § 2-203 cmt.
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Suppose that H's residuary devisee, R, was devised ten percent of H's
estate and that Q is the beneficiary of a revocable trust that comprises
ninety percent of augmented estate. If R and Q are required to contrib-
ute to satisfy W's elective share, at W's death any unexpended portion
of the trust that is created under section 2-203 will be paid to R or
R's surviving issue if R predeceases W. 39
Although this seems inconsistent with H's intent, in most cases,
the residuary devisee is the testator's primary beneficiary. Furthermore,
ease of administration is the trade off for occasionally defeating the
testator's intent. It could be inconvenient to locate every nonprobate
beneficiary (or his or her surviving issue) if several years have elapsed
between the deaths of H and W.
VI. 1990 UPC INTESTACY PROVISIONS
West Virginia also enacted the majority of the 1990 UPC intestacy
provisions. A thorough analysis of these provisions has already been
accomplished by the Professor John W. Fisher, If, who served as the
Reporter for the Advisory Committee of the West Virginia Law Insti-
tute.1" Although most provisions were adopted unchanged from the




Many commentators prefer a community property system over a
common-law system-even if the common-law jurisdiction theoretically
could implement a fair elective-share system. However, converting a
common-law jurisdictions to a community property system is viewed
139. Because the property is distributed as if H died immediately after W, the anti-
lapse statute would be invoked which would substitute R's issue in the event that R prede-
ceased W.
140. See John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnette, Reforming the Law of Intestate Suc-
cession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61
(1990).
141. See infra app. D.
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by most as not politically feasible. With this realization in mind, law
reformers should support the 1990 UPC elective-share system.
Under the 1990 UPC provisions, the surviving spouse cannot be
disinherited through the use of will substitutes. Bringing nonprobate
assets within the reachable estate is absolutely essential to a meaning-
ful spousal protection statute. If legislators do not enact a comprehen-
sive statute that does so, courts will have to continue to reach these
assets on a case-by-case, asset-by-asset basis. This plodding judicial
approach will postpone the implementation of an equitable system and
will cause confusion in the interim.
The 1990 UPC avoids overprotection by taking into account
noriprobate assets payable to the surviving spouse. These assets, as
well as assets devised to the spouse and assets disclaimed by the
spouse, are applied first toward the satisfaction of the spouse's entitle-
ment. This process ensures that the testator's scheme of distribution
will be preserved as much as possible.
The marital sharing concept is implemented in two ways: (1) by
the inclusion of the assets of the surviving spouse into the augmented
estate, and (2) by the accrued-share approach. Including the assets of
the surviving spouse in the computation is necessary in order to
achieve equalization. The accrued-share approach reaches a fairer result
than the traditional approach, especially in the most frequent kind of
elective-share case where the surviving spouse is pitted against the
children of decedent's prior marriage. If the second marriage is shorter
than fifteen years, the surviving spouse is not entitled, by way of the
elective share, to the full fifty percent entitlement. This helps ensure
that the testator's natural desire to benefit his or her children will
come to fruition. The second spouse in a late-in-life second marriage
may be "disinherited" not because of a failed marriage, but because of
a higher felt obligation to the testator's lineal descendants.
Although this system is based on community property principles, it
avoids some of the complicated aspects of community property. Sepa-
rate property is not kept out of the pool of marital property. However,
roughly the same result is reached as with community property be-
cause of the ever increasing fraction that is applied to'all of their
assets. This approximates the community property system where a
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constant fraction, fifty percent, is applied to the ever increasing amount
of community property accumulated by the couple.
The aspect of the elective-share system that is most unlike com-
munity property is that equalization will not occur unless the wealthy
spouse dies first. If the idea of community property were carried to its
logical conclusion, the beneficiaries of the estate would have a claim
against the spouse in whose name most of the property was titled.
This system stops short of that logical conclusion because the statute is
for the benefit of the surviving spouse who chooses to elect it. It is
not for the benefit of the successors-in-interest of the decedent. Per-
haps legislators will take that next step at a later time. After all, the
right to choose one's successors-in-interest is a valuable incident of
ownership. If the decedent in a long marriage had "earned" his or her
half of the property that was titled in the survivor's name, arguably he
or she should be able to choose the successors-in-interest.
It is inevitable that the surface complexity of the system will
impede its acceptance to a certain extent. However, a degree of com-
plexity is a necessary trade-off for a system that must respond to the
complex financial arrangements found in modem marriages. Further-
more, once understood, it is easy to implement because it is mechani-
cal. It is less complex than the pre-1990 UPC. It avoids the tracing to
source problems associated with community property, and it avoids the
discretionary aspects of equitable distribution. Although the provisions
will rarely exactly fit the economic realities of a given couple, it will
reach a fair result in most cases. The benefits of the mechanical sys-
tem outweigh the unpredictability of a system based on judicial discre-
tion.
As Professors Langbein and Waggoner point out, since it is easier
to get out of a bad marriage than it used to be, most failed marriages
will end in divorce rather than disinheritance at death. However, there
are not so few cases of intentional and unfair disinheritance that no
protection is needed. Many current statutes are ineffective in prevent-
ing disinheritance. In many states a spouse may be better off at di-
vorce than at death, because at divorce the equitable distribution statute
applies. At the same time, current statutes also can result in overpro-
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tection because they do not take into account the length of the mar-
riage.
No statute can close every imaginable loophole. Under any system,
a person intent on disinheritance will find a way to do it-even if it
means, for example, putting all of his or her money in real estate in a
non-UPC state. The best any system can do is to close the loopholes
that realistically can and will be used for purposes of intentional disin-
heritance. The 1990 UPC does this in a way that brings elective-share
law in line with the economic partnership theory of marriage, yet it
allows those couples who choose not to be governed by the provisions
to opt out of them by contract. Because this system represents a vast
improvement over current statutes, lawyers, judges, and legislators
across the country should follow West Virginia's leadership and active-
ly support enactment of the 1990 UPC.
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APPENDIX A - ILLUSTRATION
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS:
H died testate October 26, 1992, a resident of a state that
has adopted the elective-share provisions of the 1990 UPC. H was
survived by a wife W and four children, A, B, t, and D. A, B,
and C are H's children from a previous marriage and D is the
biological child of H and W. H and W were married June 11,
1987. Neither H nor W have given written consent or joinder for
any transfer as described by § 2-202(c)(ii).
Under the terms of his will, H devised 100 shares of stock
in corporation X worth $10,000 to W. H devised the balance of
his probate estate to A, B, C, and D, share and share alike. The
value of H's gross probate estate is $480,000, and is subject to
enforceable claims of $120,000. W also receives the $15,000
homestead allowance, exempt property valued at $10,000, and a
family allowance of $18,000. All other factors relevant to the
computation of the elective share are included in the following:
II. DETERMINATION OF THE DECEDENT'S AUGMENTED ESTATE:
A. Section 2-202(b)(1) captures the probate estate reduced
by funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance,
family allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims.
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B. Section 2-202(b)(2) provides for inclusion of the
decedent's reclaimables.
1. In 1982, H purchased a farm naming child A as
joint tenant with right of survivorship. At the time of H's death,
the farm was worth $100,000. Since H made the transfer prior to
H's marriage to W, § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) controls and H's unilaterally
severable interest will be added to the augmented estate. $50,000
2. In 1984, H's mother died and named H the life-
time beneficiary of a trust over which H was given a special
power of appointment. The value of the corpus at H's death was
$125,000. Since H was not given a general power of appointment
over any portion of the trust, the entire value is excluded from
H's augmented estate. -0-
3. In 1985, H transferred $100,000 into a trust for
the benefit of child B maintaining a general power of appoint-
ment. In 1991, the value of the trust had increased to $125,000
and H transferred the entire corpus to child B, thereby exercising
his general power. At H's death, the value of the trust had grown
to $140,000. Since H made a transfer in which he retained a
presently exercisable general power of appointment and exercised
the power while married and within two years of death, the value
of the trust will be included in the augmented estate. Section
2-202(d) dictates that the irrevocable exercise of the general pow-
er within two years of death and while married to the surviving
spouse will result in valuing the property at the time of the exer-
cise and not at H's death. $125,000
4. In May 1986, H transferred $50,000 into a revocable
trust naming child C the beneficiary. In 1991, H revoked the trust
and transferred the money into a joint bank account with C, giv-
ing C the right of survivorship. The value of the account is
$52,000 at H's death. Even though H revoked the trust within two
years of death and while married to the surviving spouse,
§ 2-202(b)(2)(i) does not control because H exercised the power
in his favor. On the other hand, the transfer into the joint bank
account fits into both § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) and § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C).
Using the § 2-202(d) greater value rule, § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(C) con-
trols and the percent of H's contribution multiplied by the at
death valuation of the account is included in the augmented estate
(100% of $52,000). $52,000
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5. In 1991, H gave child D a sports car for gradua-
tion valued at $25,000. This transfer is governed by
§ 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D) which allows a $10,000 yearly exemption for
gifts. Therefore, only $15,000 would be included in the augmented
estate. $15,000
6. In 1980, H purchased a $75,000 life insurance policy
on his life payable at death to his nephew N. The 1990 UPC
captures the proceeds of such policies into the augmented estate
under § 2-202(b)(2)(iii). $75,000
7. On June 5, 1987, H transferred the family resi-
dence to children A, B, and C retaining a life estate. At the time
of H's death, the house was worth $175,000. Since the transfer
was prior to the marriage, § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A) does not apply and
no part of the value is captured into the augmented estate. -0-
8. In 1988, H transferred $100,000 into a trust stat-
ing that the trustee shall distribute from time to time such
amounts of the income or principal as the trustee determines in
his sole discretion necessary to keep H "comfortable" for life. The
trustee is also given the power to transfer the entire corpus to H's
brother B if the trustee determines B has demonstrated an ability
to adequately manage the money. In 1991, the trustee transfers the
corpus to B and terminates the trust which has a value of
$120,000. At H's death, the proceeds of the trust are valued at
$150,000. Section 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(B) captures the value of the
trust measured at the time of the transfer to B. $120,000
C. Section 2-202(b)(3) includes the value of property to
which the surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's
death.
1. H and W had a joint bank account with right of
survivorship containing $25,000 when H died. W is able to estab-
lish that $15,000 of the account was contributed by her from her
personal assets. The better rule here is to include only the amount
contributed by the decedent. $10,000
2. In 1990, H purchased a $60,000 life insurance
policy on his life payable to W. The full amount will be included
in the augmented estate under § 2-202(b)(3). $60,000
[Vol. 95:55
72
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss1/5
1990 UPC-WEST VIRGINIA PAVES THE WAY
D. Section 2-202(b)(4) includes the value of the surviving
spouse's separate property.
1. At the decedent's death, IW had a separate bank
account containing $20,000. The full value of this account will go
into the augmented estate. $20,000
2. The $15,000 of the $25,000 joint bank account
mentioned above in C. 1 which represents W's contribution to the
account must be included. $15,000
3. On July 5, 1987, W transferred 40 shares of
Generic stock to a trust, retaining the income for life. The value
of the trust corpus is $9,000 at H's death. The value of this trust
will be included in H's augmented estate because it would have
been in W's reclaimable estate under § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(A) had W
predeceased H. $9,000
IH. AUGMENTED ESTATE: $868,000
IV. ELECTIVE SHARE: (15% of the augmented estate) $130,200
V. SATISFACTION OF ELECTIVE SHARE:
A. Amount of elective share: $130,200
B. Charges against surviving spouse in satisfaction of the
elective share:
1. § 2-207(a)(1) (see II.C.1 above) $10,000
2. § 2-207(a)(2) (see II.C.2 above) $60,000
3. § 2-207(a)(4) (.3 x $44,000) $13,200
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VI. CONTRIBUTION DUE FROM RECIPIENTS: If a deficit remains
after application of § 2-207(a)(1)-(3), the beneficiaries of the
decedent's reclaimable estate will be required to satisfy the deficit
based on the amount each recipient received as a percentage of all
amounts received. Section 2-207(b)-(c) creates a priority system
for recipients, and recipients of irrevocable transfers made within
two years of death which are included in the decedent's reclaim-
able estate do not have to contribute unless a deficit still remains
after collecting from all other recipients. As mentioned before, the
drafters intended to give priority only to § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D)
transfers, and this is the better rule. As a'result, the only priority
transfer in this illustration is H's gift of the car to child D. The
following is a list of the reclaimable assets that are not priority
transfers and, accordingly, will contribute to satisfy the $47,000
deficit in shares proportional to their interest in the decedent's
reclaimable estate.
RECIPIENT H'S J/T TRUST LIFE TOTAL % OF AMOUNT
WILL (s) ($) INS. ($) ALL OF $47,000
($) ($) REQUIRED
A 76,750 50,000 - 126,750 17.39 8,171.81
B 76,750 - 125,000 201,750 27.67 13,007.20
C 76,750 52,000 - 128,750 17.66 8,300.75
D '76,750 - - 76,750 10.53 4,948.22
N - - 75,000 75,000 10.29 4,835.39
R - 120,000 - 120,000 16.46 7,736.63
TOTALS 307,000 102,000 245,000 75,000 729,000 100 47,000
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2-102 Share of Spouse
2-103 Share of Heirs other than Surviving Spouse
2-104 Requirement that Heir Survive Decedent for 120 Hours
2-105 No Taker
2-106 Representation
2-107 Kindred of Half Blood
2-108 Afterbom Heirs
2-109 Advancements
2-110 Debts to Decedent
2-111 Alienage
2-113 Dower and Curtesy Abolished
2-144 Individuals Related to Decedent Through Two Lines
PART 2-ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
2-201 Elective Share
2-202 Augmented Estate
2-203 Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse
2-204 Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights
2-205 Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit
2-206 Effect of Election on Statutory Benefits
2-207 Charging Spouse with Owned Assets and Gifts Received; Liability of Others
for Balance of Elective Share
PART 3-SPOUSE AND CHILDREN UNPROVIDED FOR IN WILLS
2-301 Entitlement of Spouse; Premarital Will
2-302 Omitted Children
t Reprinted with Permission of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, IL 60611.
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PART 1
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Section 2-101. Intestate Estate.
(a) Any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by
intestate succession to the decedent's heirs as prescribed in this Code, except as
modified by the decedent's will.
(b) A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual
or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that
individual or a member of that class survives the decedent, the share of the
decedent's intestate estate to which that individual or class would have succeeded
passes as if that individual or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her]
intestate share.
Section 2-102. Share of Spouse.
The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the
surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who sur-
vives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate,
if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but a parent of the decedent
survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if
all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving
spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants who are not
descendants of the decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if
one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the sur-
viving spouse.
Section 2-103. Share of Heirs other than Surviving Spouse.
Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse
under Section 2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse,
passes in the following order to the individuals designated below who survive the
decedent:
(1) to the decedent's descendants by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if both
survive, or to the surviving parent;
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(3) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the
decedent's parents or either of them by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but
the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of grandparents,
half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal grandparents equally if both sur-
vive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the descendants of the decedent's
paternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking
by representation; and the other half passes to the decedent's maternal relatives in the
same manner; but if there is no surviving grandparent or descendant of a grandparent
on either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire estate passes to the decedent's
relatives on the other side in the same manner as the half.
Section 2-104. Requirement that Heir Survive Decedent for 120 Hours.
An individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have
predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property, and
intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If it is not
established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual who would otherwise
be an heir survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is deemed that the individual failed
to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied if its application
would result in a taking of intestate estate by the state under Section 2-105.
Section 2-105. No Taker.
If there is no taker under the provisions of this Article, the intestate estate pass-
es to the [state].
Section 2-106. Representation.
(a) [Definitions.] In this section:
(1) "Deceased descendant," "deceased parent," or "deceased grandparent"
means a descendant, parent, or grandparent who either predeceased the decedent or is
deemed to have predeceased the decedent under Section 2-104.
(2) "Surviving descendant" means a descendant who neither predeceased the
decedent nor is deemed to have predeceased the decedent under Section 2-104.
(b) [Decedent's Descendants.] If, under Section 2-103(1), a decedent's intestate
estate or a part thereof passes "by representation" to the decedent's descendants, the
estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving
descendants in the generation nearest to the decedent which contains one or more
surviving descendants and (ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left
surviving descendants, if any. Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is
allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in
the same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants as if
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the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants
had predeceased the decedent.
(c) [Descendants of Parents or Grandparents.] If, under Section 2-103(3) or
(4), a decedent's intestate estate or a part thereof passes "by representation" to the
descendants of the decedent's deceased parents or either of them or to the descen-
dants of the decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents or either of them,
the estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviv-
ing descendants in the generation nearest the deceased parents or either of them, or
the deceased grandparents or either of them, that contains one or more surviving
descendants and (ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving
descendants, if any. Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated
one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the same
manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants as if the sur-
viving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had
predeceased the decedent.
Section 2-107. Kindred of Half Blood.
Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they
were of the whole blood.
Section 2-108. Afterborn Heirs.
An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if
the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.
Section 2-109. Advancements.
(a) If an individual dies intestate as to all or a portion of his [or her] estate,
property the decedent gave during the decedent's lifetime to an individual who, at the
decedent's death, is an heir is treated as an advancement against the heir's intestate
share only if (i) the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing or the heir
acknowledged in writing that the gift is an advancement or (ii) the decedent's con-
temporaneous writing or the heir's written acknowledgment otherwise indicates that
the gift is to be taken into account in computing the division and distribution of the
decedent's intestate estate.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), property advanced is valued as of the time
the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of the
decedent's death, whichever first occurs.
(c) If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property is
not taken into account in computing the division and distribution 'of the decedent's
intestate estate, unless the decedent's contemporaneous writing provides otherwise.
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Section 2-110. Debts to Decedent.
A debt owed to a decedent is not charged against the intestate share of any
individual except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is
not taken into account in computing the intestate share of the debtor's descendants.
Section 2-111. Alienage.
No individual is disqualified to take as an heir because the individual or an
individual through whom he [or she] claims is or has been an alien.
Section 2-112. Dower and Curtesy Abolished.
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished.
Section 2-113. Individuals Related to Decedent Through Two Lines.
An individual who is related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is
entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that would entitle the individ-
ual to the larger share.
Section 2-114. Parent and Child Relationship.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), for purposes of intestate suc-
cession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his [or her] natu-
ral parents, regardless of their marital status. The parent and child relationship may
be established under [the Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appro-
priate statutory reference].
(b) An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or parents
and not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of
either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship between the child and that
natural parent or (ii) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit
from or through the other natural parent
(c) Inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his [or her]
kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or
hers], and has not refused to support the child.
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PART 2
ELECTIVE SHARE OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
Section 2-201. Elective Share.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount.] The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies
domiciled in this State has a right of election, under the limitations and conditions
stated in this Part, to take an elective-share amount equal to the value of the elec-
tive-share percentage of the augmented estate, determined by the length of time the
spouse and the decedent were married to each other, in accordance with the follow-
ing schedule:
If the decedent and the
spouse were married to The elective-share
each other: percentage is:
Less than 1 year ........................ Supplemental Amount Only.
1 year but less than 2 years ................ 3% of the augmented estate.
2 years but less than 3 years ................ 6% of the augmented estate.
3 years but less than 4 years ................ 9% of the augmented estate.
4 years but less than 5 years ................ 12% of the augmented estate.
5 years but less than 6 years ................ 15% of the augmented estate.
6 years but less than 7 years ................ 18% of the augmented estate.
7 years but less than 8 years ................ 21% of the augmented estate.
8 years but less than 9 years ................ 24% of the augmented estate.
9 years but less than 10 years .. ............. 27% of the augmented estate.
10 years but less than 11 years .............. 30% of the augmented estate.
11 years but less than 12 years .............. 34% of the augmented estate.
12 years but less than 13 years ............. 38% of the augmented estate.
13 years but less than 14 years ................ 42% of the augmented estate.
14 years but less than 15 years .............. 46% of the augmented estate.
15 years or more ........................ 50% of the augmented estate.
(b) [Supplemental Elective-Share Amount.] If the sum of the amounts de-
scribed in Sections 2-202(b)(3) and (4), 2-207(a)(1) and (3), and that part of the
elective-share amount payable from the decedent's probate and reclaimable estates
under Sections 2-207(b) and (c) is less than [$50,000], the surviving spouse is enti-
tled to a supplemental elective-share amount equal to [$50,000], minus the sum of
the amounts described in those sections. The supplemental elective-share amount is
payable from the decedent's probate estate and from recipients of the decedent's
reclaimable estate in the order of priority set forth in Sections 2-207(b) and (c).
(c) [Non-Domiciliary.] The right, if any, of the surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies domiciled outside this State to take an elective share in property in this
'State is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.
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Section 2-202. Augmented Estate.
(a) [Definitions.]
(1) In this section:
(i) "Bona fide purchaser" means a purchaser for value in good faith
and without notice of an adverse claim. The notation of a state documentary fee on a
recorded instrument pursuant to [insert appropriate reference] is a prima facie evi-
dence that the transfer described therein was made to a bona fide purchaser.
(ii) "Nonadverse party" means a person who does not have a sub-
stantial beneficial interest in the trust or other property arrangement that would be
adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power the he [or she] pos-
sesses respecting the trust or other property arrangement. A person having general
power of appointment over property is deemed to have a beneficial interest in the
property.
(iii) "Presently exercisable general power of appointment" means a
power of appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent by an exer-
cise of the power could have created an interest, present or future, in himself [or
herself] or his [or her] creditors.
(iv) "Probate estate" means property, whether real or personal, mov-
able or immovable, wherever situated, that would pass by intestate succession if the
decedent died without a valid will.
(v) "Right to income" includes a right to payments under an annuity
or similar contractual arrangement.
(vi) "Value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the
decedent's death" and "value of property to which the surviving spouse succeeds by
reason of the decedent's death" include the commuted value of any present or future
interest then held by the surviving spouse and the commuted value of amounts pay-
able to the surviving spouse after the decedent's death under any trust, life insurance
settlement option, annuity contract, public or private pension, disability compensation,
death benefit or retirement plan, or any similar arrangement, exclusive of the federal
Social Security system.
(2) In subsections (b)(2)(iii) and (iv), "transfer" includes an exercise or
release of a power of appointment, but does not include a lapse of a power of ap-
pointment.
(b) [Property Included in Augmented Estate.] The augmented estate consists
of the sum of:
(1) the value of the decedent's probate estate, reduced by funeral and ad-
ministration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemptions, and
enforceable claims;
(2) the value of the decedent's reclaimable estate. The decedent's reclaim-
able estate is composed of all property, whether real or personal, movable or immov-
able, wherever situated, not including in the decedent's probate estate, of any of the
following types:
(i) property to the extent the passing of the principal thereof to or for
the benefit of any person, other than the decedent's surviving spouse, was subject to
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a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the decedent alone, if
the decedent held that power immediately before his [or her] death or if and to the
.extent the decedent, while married to his [or her] surviving spouse and during the
two-year period next preceding the decedent's death, released that power or exercised
that power in favor of any person other than the decedent or the decedent's estate,
spouse, or surviving spouse;
(ii) property, to the extent of the decedent's unilaterally severable
interest therein, held by the decedent and any other person, except the decedent's sur-
viving spouse, with right of survivorship, if the decedent held that interest immediate-
ly before his [or her] death or if and to the extent the decedent, while married to his
[or her] surviving spouse and during the two-year period preceding the decedent's
death, transferred that interest to any person other than the decedent's surviving
spouse;
(iii) proceeds of insurance, including accidental death benefits, on the
life of the decedent payable to any person other than the decedent's surviving spouse,
if the decedent owned the insurance policy, had the power to change the beneficiary
of the insurance policy, or the insurance policy was subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment held by the decedent alone immediately before his [or
her] death or if and to the extent the decedent, while married to his [or her] surviv-
ing spouse and during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death, trans-
ferred that policy to any person other than the decedent's surviving spouse; and
(iv) property transferred by the decedent to any person other than a
bona fide purchaser at any time during the decedent's marriage to the surviving
spouse, to or for the benefit or any person, other than the decedent's surviving
spouse, if the transfer is of any of the following types:
(A) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the
time of or during the two-year period next preceding his [or her] death the posses-
sion or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property;
(B) any transfer to the extent that, at the time of or during the
two-year period next preceding the decedent's death, the income or principal was
subject to a power, exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any
other person or exercisable by a nonadverse party, for the benefit of the decedent or
the decedent's estate;
(C) any transfer of property, to the extent the decedent's con-
tribution to it, as a percentage of the whole, was made within two years before the
decedent's death, by which the property is held, at the time of or during the two-year
period next preceding the decedent's death, by the decedent and another, other than
the decedent's surviving spouse, with right of survivorship; or
(D) any transfer made to a donee within two years before the
decedent's death to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either
of the years exceed $10,000.00;
(3) the value of property to which the surviving spouse succeeds by reason
of the decedent's death, other than by homestead allowance, exempt property, family
allowance, testate succession, or intestate succession, including the proceeds of insur-
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ance, including accidental death benefits, on the life of the decedent and benefits
payable under a retirement plan in which the decedent was a participant, exclusive of
the federal Social Security system; and
(4) the value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's
death, reduced by enforceable claims against that property or that spouse, plus the
value of amounts that would have been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaim-
able estate had the spouse predeceased the decedent. But amounts that would have
been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate under subsection
(b)(2)(iii) are not valued as if he [or she] were deceased.
(c) [Exclusions.] Any transfer or exercise or release of a j)ower of appointment
is excluded from the decedent's reclaimable estate (i) to the extent the decedent re-
ceived adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer,
exercise, or release or (ii) if irrevocably made with the written consent or joinder of
the surviving spouse.
(d) [Valuation.] Property is valued as of the decedent's death, but property
irrevocably transferred during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death
which is included in the decedent's reclaimable estate under subsection (b)(2)(i), (ii),
and (iv) is valued as of the time of the transfer. If the terms of more than one of
the subparagraphs or sub-subparagraphs of subsection (b)(2) apply, the property is
included in the augmented estate under the subparagraph or sub-subparagraph that
yields the highest value. For the purposes of this subsection, an "irrevocable transfer
of property" includes an irrevocable exercise or release of a power of appointment.
(e) [Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.]
(1) Although under this section a payment, item of property, or other benefit
is included in the decedent's reclaimable estate, a payor or other third party is not
liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or other benefit
to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, or for having taken any other
action in good faith reliance on the validity of a governing instrument, upon request
and satisfactory proof of the decedent's death, before the payor or other third party
received written notice from the surviving spouse or spouse's representative of an
intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective
share has been filed. A payor or other third party is liable for payments made or
other actions taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of an
intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective
share has been filed.
(2) The written notice of intention to file a petition for the elective share or
that a petition for the elective share has been filed must-be mailed to the payor's or
other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, or served upon by the payor or other third party in the same manner as a
summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of intention to file a peti-
tion for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed, a
payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item
of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceed-
ings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to
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or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents'
estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court shall hold the
funds or item of property and, upon its determination under Section 2-205(d), shall
order disbursement in accordance with the determination. If no petition is filed in 'the
court within the specified time under Section 2-205(a) or, if filed, the demand for an
elective share is withdrawn under Section 2-205(c), the court shall order disbursement
to the designated beneficiary. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the
court discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the value of
amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the Court.
(3) Upon petition to the probate court by the beneficiary designated in a
governing instrument, the court may order that all or part of the property be paid to
the beneficiary in an amount and subject to conditions consistent with this section.
(f) [Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability of Recipient.]
(1) A person who purchases property from a recipient for value and without
notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satis-
faction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this Part to
return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this Part for the
amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a person
who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit includ-
ed in the decedent's reclaimable estate is obligated to return the payment, item of
property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the
value of the item of property or benefit, as provided in Section 2-207.
(2) If any section or part of any section of this Part is preempted by federal
law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit included in
the decedent's reclaimable estate, a person who, not for value, receives the payment,
item of property, or any other benefit is obligated to return that payment, item of
property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of that payment or the
value of that item of property or benefit, as provided in Section 2-207, to the person
who would have been entitled to it were that section or part of that section not pre-
empted.
Section 2-203. Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse.
(a) [Surviving Spouse Must Be Living at Time of Election.] The right of
election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse who is living when the petition
for the elective share is filed in the court under Section 2-205(a). If the election is
not exercised by the surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviv-
ing spouse's behalf by his [or her] conservator, guardian, or agenit under the authority
of a power of attorney.
(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is exercised on behalf of
a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, that portion of the elective-share
and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the deeedent's'probate estate and
recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under Sections 2-207(b) and (c) must
be placed in a custodial trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse under the pro-
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visions of the [Enacting state] Uniform Custodial Trust Act, except as modified be-
low. For the purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a surviving spouse
by an agent under a durable power of attorney is presumed to be on behalf of a
surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person. For purposes of the custodial trust
established by this subsection, (i) the electing guardian, conservator, or agent is the
custodial trustee, (ii) the surviving spouse is the beneficiary, (iii) the custodial trust is
deemed to have been created by the decedent spouse by written transfer that takes
effect at the decedent spouse's death and that directs the custodial trustee to adminis-
ter the custodial trust as for an incapacitated beneficiary.
(c) [Custodial Trust.] For the purposes of subsection (b) the [Enacting state]
Uniform Custodial Trust Act must be applied as if Section 6(b) thereof were repealed
and Sections 2(e), 9(b), and 17(a) were amended to read as follows:
(1) Neither an incapacitated beneficiary nor anyone acting on behalf of an
incapacitated beneficiary has a power to terminate the custodial trust; but if the bene-
ficiary regains capacity, the beneficiary then acquires the power to terminate the
custodial trust by delivering to the custodial trustee a writing signed by the benefi-
ciary declaring the termination. If not previously terminated, the custodial trust ter-
minates on the death of the beneficiary.
(2) If the beneficiary is incapacitated, the custodial trustee shall expend so
much or all of the custodial trust property as the custodial trustee considers advisable
for the use and benefit of the beneficiary and individuals who were supported by the
beneficiary when the beneficiary became incapacitated, or who are legally entitled to
support by the beneficiary. Expenditures may be made in the manner, when, and to
the extent that the custodial trustee determines suitable and proper, without court
order but with regard to other support, income, and property of the beneficiary [ex-
clusive of] [and] benefits of medical or other forms of assistance from any state or
federal government or governmental agency for which the beneficiary must qualify on
the basis of need.
(3) Upon the beneficiary's death, the remaining custodial trust property, in
the following order: (i) under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the
beneficiary's predeceased spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if
that predeceased spouse died immediately after the beneficiary; or (ii) to that prede-
ceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711 of [this State's] Uniform Probate Code.
[STATES THAT HAVE NOT ADOPTED THE UNIFORM CUSTODIAL
TRUST ACT SHOULD ADOPT THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE
SUBSECTION (b) AND NOT ADOPT SUBSECTION (b) OR (b) ABOVE]
(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is exercised on behalf of
a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the court must set aside that por-
tion of the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the
decedent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under
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Section 2-207(b) and (c) and must appoint a trustee to administer that property for
the support of the surviving spouse. For the purposes of this subsection, an election
on behalf of a surviving spouse by an agent under a durable power of attorney is
presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person. The
trustee must administer the trust in accordance with the following terms and such
additional terms as the court determines appropriate:
(1) Expenditures of income and principal may be made in the manner,
when, and to the extent that the trustee determines suitable and proper for the sur-
viving spouse's support, without court order but with regard to other support, income,
and property of the surviving spouse [exclusive of] [and] benefits of medical or other
forms of assistance from any state or federal government or governmental agency for
which the surviving spouse must qualify on the basis of need.
(2) During the surviving spouse's incapacity, neither the surviving spouse
nor anyone acting on behalf of the surviving spouse has a power to terminate the
trust; but if the surviving spouse regains capacity, the surviving spouse then acquires
the power to terminate the trust and acquire full ownership of the trust property free
of trust, by delivering to the trustee a writing signed by the surviving spouse declar-
ing the termination.
(3) Upon the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall transfer the unex-
pended trust property in the following order: (i) under the residuary clause, if any, of
the will of the predeceased spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if
that predeceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse; or (ii) to that
predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711.]
Section 2-204. Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights.
(a) The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving
spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, or any of
them, may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written
contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the surviving spouse.
(b) A surviving spouse's waiver is not enforceable if the surviving spouse
proves that:
(1) he [or she] did not execute the waiver voluntarily;
(2) the waiver was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execu-
tion of the waiver, he [or she]:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property
or financial obligations of the decedent;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the decedent beyond the dis-
closure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the decedent.
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(d) Unless it provides to the contrary,, a waiver of "all rights," or equivalent
language, in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse or a complete
property settlement entered into after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a
waiver of all rights of elective share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance by each spouse in the property of the other and a renunciation by
each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to him [or her] from the other by
intestate succession or by virtue of any will executed before the waiver or property
settlement.
Section 2-205. Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the election must be made by filing in
the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a petition
for the elective share within nine months after the date of the decedent's death, or
within six months after the probate of the decedent's will, whichever limitation later
expires. The surviving spouse must give notice of the time and place set for hearing
to persons interested in the estate and to the distributees and recipients of portions of
the augmented estate whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the
elective share. Except as provided in subsection (b), the decedent's reclaimable estate,
described in Section 2-202(b)(2), is not included within the augmented estate for the
purpose of computing the elective share, if the petition is filed more than nine
months after the decedent's death.
(b) Within nine months after the decedent's death, the surviving spouse may
petition the court for an extension of time for making an election. If, within nine
months after the decedent's death, the spouse gives notice of the petition to all per-
sons interested in the decedent's reclaimable estate, the court for cause shown by the
surviving spouse may extend the time for election. If the court grants the spouse's
petition for an extension, the decedent's reclaimable estate, described in Section
2-202(b)(2), is not excluded from the augmented estate for the purpose of computing
the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, if the spouse makes an
election by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative,
if any, a petition for the elective share within the time allowed by the extension.
(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his [or her] demand for an elective
share at any time before entry of a final determination by the court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the court shall determine the elective-share and
supplemental elective-share amounts, and shall order its payment from the assets of
the augmented estate or by contribution as appears appropriate under Section 2-207.
If it appears that a fund or property included in the augmented estate has not come
into the possession of the personal representative, or has been distributed by the
personal representative, the court nevertheless shall fix the liability of any person
who has any interest in the fund or property or who has possession thereof, whether
as trustee or otherwise. The proceeding may be maintained against fewer than all
persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject to contribution
1992]
87
Roberts: The 1990 Uniform Probate Code's Elective-Share Provisions--West V
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
142 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:55
in any greater amount than he [or she] would have been under Section 2-207 had
relief been secured against all persons subject to contribution.
(e) An order or judgment of the court may be enforced as necessary in suit for
contribution or payment in other courts of this State or other jurisdictions.
Section 2-206. Effect of Election on Statutory Benefits.
If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the surviving spouse, the
surviving spouse's homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, if
any, are not charged against but are in addition to the elective-share and supplemen-
tal elective-share amounts.
Section 2-207. Charging Spouse with Owned Assets and Gifts Received; Liability
of Others for Balance of Elective Share.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount Only.] In a proceeding for an elective share, the
following are applied first to satisfy the elective-share amount and to reduce or elimi-
nate any contributions due from the decedent's probate estate and recipients of the
decedent's reclaimable estate:
(1) amounts included in the augmented estate which pass or have passed to
the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession;
(2) amounts included in the augmented estate under Section 2-202(b)(3);
(3) amounts included in the augmented estate which would have passed to
the spouse but were disclaimed; and
(4) amounts included in the augmented estate under Section 2-202(b)(4) up
to the applicable percentage thereof. For the purposes of this subsection, the "appli-
cable percentage" is twice the elective-share percentage set forth in the schedule in
Section 2-201(a) appropriate to the length of time the spouse and the decedent were
married to each other.
(b) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share Amount; Supplemental Elective-
Share Amount.] If, after the application of subsection (a), the elective-share amount
is not fully satisfied or the surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-
share amount, amounts included in the decedent's probate estate and that portion of
the decedent's reclaimable estate other than amounts irrevocably transferred within
two years before the decedent's death are applied first to satisfy the unsatisfied bal-
ance of the elective-share amount or the supplemental elective-share amount. The
decedent's probate estate and that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate are so
applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or for
the supplemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients
of the decedent's probate estate and that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate
in proportion to the value of their interests therein.
(c) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share and Supplemental Elective-Share
Amounts.] If, after the application of subsections (a) and (b), the elective-share or
supplemental elective-share amount is not fully satisfied, the remaining portion of the
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decedent's reclaimable estate is so applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of
the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned
among the recipients of that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate in proportion
to the value of their interests therein.
(d) [Liability of Recipients of Reclaimable Estate and Their Donees.] Only
original recipients of the reclaimable estate described in Section 2-202(b)(2), and the
donees of the recipients of the reclaimable estate to the extent the donees have the
property or its proceeds, are liable to make a proportional contribution toward satis-
faction of the surviving spouse's elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount.
A person liable to make contribution may choose to give. up the proportional part of
the reclaimable estate or to pay the value of the amount for which he [or she] is
liable.
PART 3
SPOUSE AND CHILDREN UNPROVIDED FOR IN WILLS
Section 2-301. Entitlement of Spouse; Premarital Will.
(a) If a testator's surviving spouse married the testator after the testator exe-
cuted his [or her] will, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive, as an intestate
share, no less than the value of the share of the estate he [or she] would have re-
ceived if the testator had died intestate as to that portion of the testator's estate, if
any, that neither is devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator
married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse nor is
devised or passes under Sections 2-603 or 2-604 to a descehdant of such a child,
unless:
(1) it appears from the will or other evidence that the will was made in
contemplation of the testator's marriage to the surviving spouse;
(2) the will expresses the intention that it is to be effective notwithstanding
any subsequent marriage; or
(3) the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the
intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by the
testator's statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or
other evidence.
(b) In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises made by the will to
the testator's surviving spouse, if any, are applied first, and other devises, other than
a devise to a child of the testator who was born before the testator married the sur-
viving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse or a devise or substi-
tute gift under Section 2-603 or 2-604 to a descendant of such a child, abate as
provided in Section 3-902.
1992]
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Section 2-302. Omitted Children.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if a testator fails to provide in his [or
her] will for any of his [or her] children born or adopted after the execution of the
will, the omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate as
follows:
(1) If the testator had no child living when he [or she] executed the will, an
omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate equal in value
to that which the child would have received had the testator died intestate, unless the
will devised all or substantially all the estate to the other parent of the omitted child
and that other parent survives the testator and is entitled to take under the will.
(2) If the testator had one or more children living when he [or she] exe-
cuted the will, and the will devised property or an interest in property to one or
more of the then-living children, an omitted after-born or after-adopted child is enti-
tled to share in the testator's estate as follows:
(i) The portion of the testator's estate in which the omitted after-born
or after-adopted child is entitled to share is limited to devises made to the testator's
then-living children under the will.
(ii) The omitted after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to receive
the share of the testator's estate, as limited in subparagraph (i), that the child would
have received had the testator included all omitted after-born and after-adopted chil-
dren with the children to whom devises were made under the will and had given an
equal share of the estate to each child.
(iii) To the extent feasible, the interest granted an omitted after-born
or after-adopted child under this section must be of the same character, whether equi-
table or legal, present or future, as that devised to the testator's then-living children
under the will.
(iv) In satisfying a share provided by this paragraph, devises to the
testator's children who were living when the will was executed abate ratably. In
abating the devises of the then-living children, the court shall preserve to the maxi-
mum extent possible the character of the testamentary plan adopted by the testator.
(b) Neither subsection (a)(1) nor subsection (a)(2) applies if:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional; or
(2) the testator provided for the omitted after-born or after-adopted child by
transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by the testator's statements or is reasonably inferred from the
amount of the transfer or other evidence.
(c) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in his [or
her] will for a living child solely because he [or she] believes the child to be dead,
the child receives a share in the estate equal to the value to that which the child
would have received had the testator died intestate.
(d) In satisfying a share provided by subsection (a)(1) or (c), devises made by
the will abate under Section 3-902.
[Vol. 95:55
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APPENDIX C - CONVERSION CHART (UPC = W. VA. CODE)
UPC W. VA. CODE
§ 1-201 § 42-1-1
§ 2-101 § 42-1-2
§ 2-102 § 42-1-3
§ 2-103 § 42-1-3a
§ 2-104 § 42-1-3b
§ 2-105 § 42-1-3c
§ 2-106 § 42-1-3d
§ 2-107 § 42-1-3e
§ 2-108 § 42-1-3f
§ 2-109 § 42-1-3g
§ 2-111 § 42-1-4
§ 2-112 § 43-1-1
§ 2-113 § 42-1-10
§ 2-201 § 42-3-1
§ 2-202 § 42-3-2
§ 2-203 § 42-3-3
§ 2-204 § 42-3-3a
§ 2-205 § 42-3-4
§ 2-206 § 42-3-5
§ 2-207 § 42-3-6
§ 2-301 § 42-3-7
§ 2-508 § 41-1-6
(1969)
-- § 42-1-12
W. VA. CODE_ UPC
§ 41-1-6 § 2-508
(1969)
§ 42-1-1 § 2-201
§ 42-1-2 § 2-101
§ 42-1-3 § 2-102
§ 42-1-3a § 2-103
§ 42-1-3b § 2-104
§ 42-1-3c § 2-105
§ 42-1-3d § 2-106
§ 42-1-3e § 2-107
§ 42-1-3f § 2-108
§ 42-1-3g § 2-109
§ 42-1-4 § 2-111
§ 42-1-10 § 2-113
§ 42-3-1 § 2-201
§ 42-3-2 § 2-202
§ 42-3-3 § 2-203
§ 42-3-3a § 2-204
§ 42-3-4 § 2-205
§ 42-3-5 § 2-206
§ 42-3-6 § 2-207
§ 42-3-7 § 2-301
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APPENDIX D - WEST VIRGINIA INTESTACY PROVISIONS
Section Name Section UPC Difference
No. Section
Intestate Estate § 42-1-2 § 2-101 None.
Share of Spouse § 42-1-3 § 2-102 W. Va. gives the surviving
spouse a fractional share
only, no set amounts.
Share of Heirs other § 42-1-3a § 2-103 None.
than Surviving Spouse
120 Hour Survival Re- § 42-1-3b § 2-104 W. Va. does not adopt a
quirement clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof.
No Taker § 42-1-3c § 2-105 None.
Representation § 42-1-3d § 2-106 Subsection (b) refers to
§ 42-1-3a generally where
the UPC refers only to
§ 2-103(1). Subsection (c)
refers to § 42-1-3a gener-
ally where UPC refers
only to § 2-1-3(3) or (4).
Kindred of Haf Blood § 42-1-3e § 2-107 None.
Afterbom Heirs § 42-1-3f § 2-108 None.
Advancements § 42-1-3g § 2-109 None.
Alienage § 41-1-4 § 2-111 None.
From Whom Bas- § 41-1-5 None. N/A
tards Inherit
Legitimation by Mar- § 41-1-6 None. N/A
riage
Issue Legitimate § 41-1-7 None. N/A
Through Marriage Null
Posthumous Children § 41-1-8 None. N/A
to Take
Establishment of Re- § 41-1-9 None. N/A
cordation of Descent
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